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ABSTRACT 
In fiscal year 2008, motorcycle fatalities in the Navy and Marine Corps totaled 
more than combat fatalities for Sailors and Marines in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  This 
study examines how motorcycle accidents and motorcycle training programs affect the 
mission and readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps.  This study focuses on the impact 
motorcycle fatalities and injuries have on manpower, and addresses the monetary costs of 
accidents, and the costs of recruiting and training individuals for service in the Navy and 
Marine Corps.  The study utilizes Navy and Marine Corps motorcycle accident data, from 
fiscal years 2000 through 2008, to estimate the probabilities of a Sailor or Marine being 
killed or injured if he is involved in a motorcycle accident.  Motorcycle accident 
information combined with recruiting and training information is used to estimate 
individual investments in 2008 dollars, and monetized cost of motorcycle accidents for 
fiscal year 2008.  The analyses indicate that individual recruiting and training may cost 
$25,000 to $170,000, depending on the occupational specialty, while individual 
motorcycle accidents may cost $22,000 to $400,000.  Additionally, the findings indicate 
that the current approved motorcycle safety course may not provide all the skills needed 
to help Sailors and Marines become safer riders. 
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The Marine Corps has approximately 17,800 registered motorcycles riders on its 
installations worldwide, while the Navy has approximately 30,100 registered motorcycle 
riders on its installations all over the world.  Approximately 50 percent of all registered 
riders in the Marine Corps operate sport bikes.  About 9,900 sport bike riders in all.  In 
comparison, about 30 percent of all registered riders in the Navy operate sport bikes.  
Approximately 11,700 sport bike riders.  While only about half the riders registered in the 
Navy and Marine Corps are sport bike riders, sport bikes claim over 80 percent of all 
reported motorcycle accidents and fatalities in the both of these services.  Despite 
initiating several measures in the form of rules and regulations, and mandatory 
motorcycle safety training, the number of accidents and fatalities has continued to climb 
until the end of fiscal year 2008.  Twenty-five Marines and 33 Sailors lost their lives in 
motorcycle accidents in 2008. These two figures are the highest number of motorcycle 
fatalities both services have seen since 1999.  Fiscal year 2008 motorcycle fatalities in the 
Navy and Marine Corps totaled more than combat fatalities for Sailors and Marines in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Since sport bikes are extremely popular within the ranks of 
both services, motorcycle incidents are not anticipated to decline unless changes are 
implemented. 
 
Figure 1.    Navy and Marine Corps Motorcycle OIF, and OEF Fatalities by Year 
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On average, the sport bike manufacturers change the design of the motorcycles 
they produce every two years.  The changes in design will not only incorporate sleek, 
new aerodynamic body styles, but very often will also include the newest technology 
developed by the manufacturers from the last two years of racing.  The technology will 
normally include improved handling and stability, better acceleration, and improved 
power-to-weight ratio, all of which are desirable upgrades in the hands of a trained 
professional.  Manufacturers bring race bike technology to the street production models 
in an effort to outdo competitors, because the consumer is always looking to purchase 
what he consider the best sport bike.  The result is a faster, lighter, more powerful sport 
bike that any military member can purchase right off the showroom floor of any 
dealership. 
Both services recognize the high risk associated with riding a sport bike, and seek 
to curtail the accidents and fatalities by means of rules, regulations, and training.  But 
there may be a fundamental flaw related to the type of training sport bike riders receive 
prior to riding a motorcycle.  Furthermore, statistics from the Naval Safety Center 
indicate that 55 percent of all Sailors and Marines killed in motorcycle accidents in 2008 
had completed some form of motorcycle course prior to operating a motorcycle.  A large 
proportion of all narratives in motorcycle accident reports point to “loss of control” as a 
major factor in the accidents’ occurrence.  Recently, both services have implemented the 
Military Sport Bike Course as a new tool to prepare sport bike riders to better handle their 
motorcycles.  Despite recognizing the risks that sport bikes pose to Sailors and Marines 
who purchase and ride sport bikes, there has been little analysis done on the effect of 
motorcycle accidents on mission readiness in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
One particular problem associated with Sailors and Marines being injured or 
killed in motorcycle accidents is that the services will be unable to gain a full return on 
investment after investing millions of dollars to recruit and train personnel for various 
military occupational specialties. Injuries and fatalities add up to substantial loss of 
manpower and accrual of hefty monetary costs to the Navy and Marine Corps. 
 3
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine how motorcycle accidents and 
motorcycle training programs affect the mission and the readiness of the Navy and 
Marine Corps.  This thesis is an examination of the main causes of motorcycle accidents 
in the Navy and Marine Corps, and examines possible beneficial training solutions to 
both the services and riders.  One objective is to estimate the probability that a Sailor or 
Marine who has completed an approved motorcycle safety course will get into a serious 
accident compared to the probability for another service member who has not taken such 
a course.  The primary research question is the following:  How do motorcycle accidents 
affect mission readiness in the Navy and Marine Corps?  The objective of this analysis is 
to help Navy and Marine Corps decision makers incorporate effective motorcycle safety 




1. How do motorcycle accidents affect mission readiness in the Navy 
and Marine Corps? 
Secondary:  
1. What are the primary causes of accidents in the Navy and Marine 
Corps? 
2. How are Sailors and Marines selected for training for motorcycle 
training courses? 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study examines the factors that contribute to motorcycle accidents and 
fatalities in the Navy and Marine Corps, and performs statistical analysis of motorcycle 
accident data in an effort to determine if the current motorcycle safety training programs  
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play a significant factor in reducing motorcycle accidents.  A probit model is utilized to 
determine the probability of a Sailor or Marine being involved in a motorcycle accident 
that renders a fatal or incapacitating injury. 
In addition, a cost benefit analysis is conducted to determine the cost of recruiting 
and training Sailors and Marines, the cost of life insurance and hospitalization after an 
accident, and the cost of a course to replace or supplement the current motorcycle safety 
program. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The goal of this study is to provide the Navy and Marine Corps with a better 
understanding of how motorcycle accidents affect manpower readiness, and provide a 
framework on which to implement changes to motorcycle safety programs for the benefit 
of the services, and Sailors and Marines.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II reviews the literature that is applicable to establishing a framework 
from which to discuss prior studies, the findings as they relate to motorcycle accidents, 
and motorcycle accident outcomes.  Chapter II also discusses Department of the Navy 
policy and the current approved motorcycle safety training. Chapter III presents the data 
and methodology used to analyze the effects of motorcycle accidents on manpower 
readiness in the Navy and Marine Corps. Chapter IV presents and examines the analyses 
and results related to the effect of motorcycle accidents in terms of manpower readiness 
and financial cost. Chapter V provides a summary, conclusion, and recommendations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The increasing number of motorcycle accidents and fatalities in the Navy and 
Marine Corps poses a serious problem for both services.  The increase in accidents and 
fatalities involving service members mimics trends of motorcycle accidents and fatalities 
in the civilian population.  The rising cost of manpower throughout the Department of 
Defense makes dealing with service members injured or killed in motorcycle accidents 
extremely expensive not only financially, but also in terms of manpower and readiness.  
Implementing changes to the current policy and motorcycle training courses throughout 
the Navy and Marine Corps could provide significant benefits to the services, and health 
and welfare of Sailors and Marines.  Better training should translate into fewer accidents, 
and the Navy and Marine Corps will benefit from more readily available manpower and 
monetary savings.  This chapter reviews prior motorcycle crash studies, motorcycle 
accident trends that involve service members, and the current problem today’s military 
faces in terms of motorcycle accidents.  Additionally, this chapter reviews how 
motorcycle changes, deployments, and motorcycle safety training affect a Sailor’s or 
Marine’s probability of being involved in a motorcycle accident. 
B. PRIOR MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT STUDIES 
One of the most significant motorcycle safety studies ever conducted, was done 
by Hurt, Ouelett, and Thorn (1981) at the Traffic Safety Center of the University of 
Southern California, Los Angeles.  This study was conducted at the request of the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in an attempt to identify the causes of 
motorcycle accidents and fatalities that were on the rise at an alarming rate.  The study, 
titled Motorcycle Accident Cause Factors and Identification of Countermeasures, was 
conducted between July 1975 and September 1980, and included more than 900 on-scene 
accident investigations, and over 3,600 police accident reports.  Some of the significant 
findings of Professor Hurt’s motorcycle accident study are highlighted in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Motorcycle Accident Study Findings (After Hurt, 1981, p. 416) 
 Twenty-five percent of the motorcycle accidents were single vehicle 
accidents involving collision with the roadway or fixed objects. 
 In the single vehicle accidents, rider contributed in 66% of the cases. 
 Typical accident error was over braking or running wide in a curve 
leading to a fall. 
 More than half the accident-involved riders had less than five months 
experience on the accident motorcycle. 
 Motorcyclist had less than two seconds to maneuver to avoid accident. 
 The likelihood of injury is extremely high; 98% in multiple vehicle 
accident, 96% in single vehicle accident, and 45% resulting in more 
than minor injury. 
 Deadliest injuries were to the chest and head. 
 Motorcycle riders with previous traffic citations and accidents were 
overrepresented in the accident data. 
 
Based on the findings of the study, the author concluded that “lack of training was 
a significant factor in accident involvement” and that there was a need for a “specialized” 
motorcycle safety course to curtail the increasing accident and injury trend that plagued 
that decade (Hurt, Ouelett, & Thorn, 1981, p. 419).  Interestingly, the Motorcycle Safety 
Foundations Basic Motorcycle Rider Course was named as one of the most effective 
countermeasures in fixing the problem.  Much has changed over the last 25 years with 
regard to the motorcycles people are riding today.  However, no other individual or 
organization has conducted a more intensive study than the one presented by Professor 
Hurt in 1981. 
The fact that no recent study of such a depth has been completed raises the 
question of whether the Motorcycle Safety Foundations Basic Rider Course still qualifies 
as the most effective countermeasure for motorcycle accidents, injuries, and fatalities, 
especially since motorcycles have changed so much over the past two decades.  Owing to 
a nationwide rise in motorcycle accidents and fatalities in the late 1990s, the Federal 
Highway Administration commissioned the Oklahoma Transportation Center at 
Oklahoma State University to conduct a new motorcycle accident study in 2005.  The 
study is still ongoing as of October 2009 (Kunitsugu, 2010, p. 8). 
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Between 2001 and 2004, the state government of Oregon completed a series of 
studies that were aimed at evaluating the Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s (MSF) newest 
entry level Basic Rider Course and Oregon’s own entry level Basic Rider Training.  The 
evaluation was sanctioned due to the Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s decision to replace 
the entry level Motorcycle Rider Course: Riding and Street Skills (MRC: RSS) with the 
current Basic Rider Course (BRC).  One purpose of these studies was to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses in Oregon’s Basic Rider Training (BRT), and compare the 
Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s Basic Rider Course to Oregon’s Basic Rider Training.  
TEAM OREGON, an organization developed in part by the Oregon Department of 
Transportation and Oregon State University, was responsible for conducting the study.  
The study compared the MSF’s BRC to Oregon’s BRT, while using the MSF’s MRC: 
RSS as a benchmark.  Based on the findings of TEAM OREGON’s study, the 
organization made the following recommendations. 
It was the unanimous recommendation of the task force that TEAM 
OREGON not adopt the BRC (classroom or range) as presented. This 
recommendation and a full report were provided to the Oregon 
Department of Transportation in November of 2002. Based on the findings 
of the field test, ODOT concluded that the BRC was not an appropriate 
curriculum for the novice riders of Oregon (and would not make a suitable 
replacement for the MRC:RSS) and directed TEAM OREGON to not 
adopt the BRC as presented. (Axman Consulting Inc., 2004, p. 8) 
In the final report published in March 2003, Steve Garets, the Director of Team Oregon, 
made the following assessment. 
The BRC has many positive attributes. However, as presented it lacks 
adequate focus, priority and RiderCoach guidance. The classroom portion 
fails to adequately address the needs of riders on Oregon’s streets and 
highways. More skill development emphasis is needed to address the skills 
identified as lacking in the accident-involved rider; specifically the 
treatment of head and eyes, cornering and traffic interaction. These issues 
must be addressed and cured before TEAM OREGON can recommend 
adoption of this curriculum.   
TEAM OREGON recommends that ODOT not adopt this curriculum until 
the issues and concerns listed are addressed and adequately tested. (Garets, 
2003, p. 9) 
 8
The recommendations by Team Oregon on the implementation of the MSF’s BRC raise 
questions on the validity and adequacy of the BRC as a course for novice motorcycle 
riders.  Even though the MSF’s BRC was rejected by Oregon, it is accepted by numerous 
other states as a waiver to the state motorcycle road test. 
C. OTHER STUDIES 
Other studies related to motorcycle accidents look at the cost for hospitalization 
and rehabilitation.  A 1996 report on hospitalization cost for motorcycle accidents in the 
state of Washington estimated that the average length of hospitalization for motorcycle 
accident victims was approximately 10 days, with an average cost of $12,689 in 1989 
dollars (Rowland et al., 1996, p. 43).  A separate study conducted in 2006 estimated that 
the average cost of hospitalization for motorcycle accident victims was $17,557 in 2002 
dollars (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2006, p. 41).  Regardless of 
which study is analyzed, the monetary costs for hospitalization and rehabilitation 
associated with motorcycle injuries will be substantial in almost all instances. 
D. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
For years, fascinating high-powered motorcycles have always been the 
recreational vehicle of choice for service members of all types.  This same fascination 
leads numerous service members to become owners of the high-powered machines, some 
far too powerful for their owners to handle, and many more even too powerful for the 
street.  This fascination with the high-powered motorcycles is not expected to diminish in 
the near future, and motorcycle ownership among military members is not expected to 
decline.  Furthermore, rising gas prices between 2006 and 2007, and fluctuating gas 
prices during most of 2008 and 2009 may be a factor related to more military members 
riding sport bikes.  Many military members purchase sport bikes for the thrill of riding, 
and many more purchase for the convenience of a cheaper alternative to having multiple 
cars in a family.  Other military members purchase sport bikes for both of the 
aforementioned reasons.  Regardless of the reason or reasons for purchase, the growing 
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popularity of sport bikes in the Navy and Marine Corps, and the increasing rate of 
accidents and fatalities, command the attention of top military leadership and Congress. 
The main problem facing motorcycle riding service members today is that there is 
a very high and ever increasing rate of accidents associated with high-power motorcycles.  
Higher accident rates lead to higher fatality rates, higher motorcycle accident injury rates, 
and higher disability rates for military services.  This will inevitably lead to higher 
financial and manpower costs for the Navy and Marine Corps if nothing is done to reduce 
the increasing rate of motorcycle accidents throughout both services.  The Naval Safety 
Center motorcycle accident data revealed that 246 Sailors and 123 Marines were either 
killed or seriously injured in motorcycle accidents in 2008 alone.  The data also indicate 
that 87 percent of the Sailors and Marines killed or injured in motorcycle accidents in 
2008 were riding sport bikes.   
Some leaders see the combination of young service members and motorcycles as 
a recipe for disaster.  Leadership intuition often is correct, as the results of such a 
combination leave service members hospitalized, permanently disabled, or fatally injured.  
All the stated injury categories cost the military vast amounts of time, money, and effort, 
which are critical assets that could be used elsewhere for training and equipping the 
military for combat operations.  Naval Safety Center motorcycle accident data indicate 
that in fiscal year 2008 alone, 246 Sailors and 123 Marines were injured or killed in 
motorcycle accidents.  One hundred and twenty-three Marines seriously injured or killed 
in motorcycle accidents amount to approximately four platoons of various military 
occupational specialties unable to perform their jobs.  Out of a company of six platoons 
of Marines, the equivalent of two-thirds of the entire company is incapacitated due to 
motorcycle accidents.  Navy figures are even more staggering.  Essentially, motorcycle 
riders are becoming one of the military’s biggest liabilities.  Obviously, riders are not 
mounting their machines with the intention of maiming themselves or ending their lives.  
Most motorcycle riders intend to have a good time and enjoy some of the freedom that 
can be satisfied only with an exhilarating ride on a powerful two-wheeled machine.   
While military and civilian riders share a great number of similarities in 
demographics, one main variable that separates the two communities is time spent on the 
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motorcycle.  Military members may spend significantly less time on their motorcycles 
due to training evolutions, deployments, and other work commitments.  The increasing 
rate of motorcycle accidents is not only affecting the military services, but is also 
affecting motorcycle riders across the United States.  The annual motorcycle accident and 
fatality rates in the United States continue to increase and, in 2006, surpassed the number 
of pedestrian fatalities for the first time since 1975, when the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) started collecting motorcycle accident statistics (United 
States Department of Transportation, 2007, p. 3). 
This increase in motorcycle accident rate affecting both the military and civilian 
community may be a combination of the type of training a rider receives and the type of 
motorcycle the rider decides to purchase.  Although the military and civilian rates of 
motorcycle accidents and fatalities increased over the last several years, there is not a vast 
amount of research conducted to determine whether the motorcycle training being offered 
to motorcycle riders is sufficient for them to handle the motorcycles they purchase.  This 
may be especially important with regard to sport bikes, which are extremely popular 
within the military ranks.  Motorcycle riders around the nation, military and civilian, all 
go through similar training based on a curriculum provided by the Motorcycle Safety 
Foundation (MSF).  While the MSF has remained the main instructional institution for 
motorcycle safety training, the training curriculum itself has seen minimal changes over 
the past several years, while the sport bikes that are being purchased and ridden by our 
service members today have seen changes almost every two years.  Some changes are 
more dramatic than others.  Each time a high-powered sport bike is changed, the result is 
better technology and a lighter, faster, more-powerful machine capable of reaching 
speeds of over 100 miles per hour in just a few seconds.  The motorcycles themselves 
have evolved immensely, while the motorcycle training offered through the Motorcycle 
Safety Foundation has remained relatively stagnant. 
Two questions need to be discussed at this point.  First, why are motorcycles 
getting lighter, faster, and more powerful all the time?  Second, why has the Motorcycle 
Safety Foundation safety course remained relatively stagnant over the years? 
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To answer the first question, we need to understand that the motorcycle 
manufacturers are in the business to maximize their profits through the sale of 
motorcycles.  The sport bikes we see today on the showroom floor of any dealership were 
built for one main purpose.  They are modeled after the latest race bikes, and were built 
as racing platforms to win races; therefore, they get lighter, faster, more powerful, and 
more agile with each new design.  A sport bike can normally be expected to be 
redesigned every 2 years.  Adding to the aforementioned characteristics, the newest 
motorcycles on the showroom floor all have the latest technology trickled down from the 
latest (sometimes prototype) racing machines used in the previous racing season.  These 
racing machines are piloted by highly skilled, professionally trained, seasoned racers.  
Most of these professionals have been riding motorcycles from a very early age, some as 
early as 5 years old, and the machines they ride are purpose built for each individual 
rider.   
Professional riders all navigate racetracks in slightly different ways unnoticeable 
to the average person.  They each have a certain way they attack a corner, or apply the 
brakes and transition to the throttle.  There is no perfect way for a professional racer to 
ride faster than a competitor, but they all have good equipment, and they know their 
machines through and through.  They also have the capability to adjust to any motorcycle 
in any riding condition.  The rule in motorcycle racing is “Win on Sunday, sell on 
Monday.”  In order to win races each year, each sport bike manufacturer is always 
looking to stay one step ahead of their competitors.  This means designing and building a 
lighter, faster, more powerful motorcycle capable of winning races.  Development on the 
motorcycles continues all year long.  Anything discovered on one race day will 
eventually find its way to the showroom models in subsequent years.  The average rider 
(military riders included) will usually want to acquire the latest model sport bike after the 
manufacturers tout the number of championships won by that particular model.  Other 
factors that attract buyers and enthusiasts include appearance, color, styles, availability, 
price, and popularity of each individual motorcycle model.  Sport bike manufacturers 
build light, fast, powerful sport bikes to win races, and winning races sells machines. 
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The second question is not as straightforward.  Why have motorcycles continued 
to evolve at an extremely fast rate, while the motorcycle training courses have not?   
The Motorcycle Safety Foundation is sponsored by the motorcycle manufacturers, 
and provides the basic and experienced level motorcycle training to riders all over the 
United States.  Again, we must specifically be reminded that the main goal of the 
manufacturers is to make a profit in the sales of motorcycles.  Motorcycles continue to 
evolve because of the racing industry, and the need for manufacturers to win 
championships and titles.  As mentioned before, winning races and titles will lead to 
more motorcycle sales, because winning a title tells a would-be customer that a particular 
manufacturer has found the winning solution, otherwise known as the best sport bike at 
that moment.  The sport bike manufacturers have found a way to bring people to purchase 
motorcycles, by ensuring a course is available easy enough to almost guarantee licensing.  
Most people know this course as the Basic Riders Course (BRC). 
In general, the Basic Riders Course (BRC) is 14 to 15 hours of combined 
classroom and practical instruction.  MSF satellite agencies nationwide often advertise a 
BRC passing rate above 90% on average (Alpha Training Center, n.d., FAQ section, 
para. 6).  One could challenge whether the manufacturers’ motive for sponsoring the 
motorcycle safety courses is to make a rider better, or whether safety is the 
manufacturers’ general concern.  In answering that question, we need to fully understand 
why the requirements to successfully complete the motorcycle safety courses are so easy.  
The basic rider course is mainly designed to give a new, inexperienced rider the basic 
skills to operate a motorcycle.  This means that the course clearly includes how to turn a 
motorcycle on and off and how to get it going, change gears, turn and maneuver.  In most 
cases, instruction is completed in an area about the size of a large parking lot at speeds of 
approximately 30 miles per hour.  Within a few days, a person who has no experience 
with motorcycles can complete this course and go to the DMV and get a motorcycle 
license, and may legally purchase and ride any type of motorcycle in almost all the states 
in the United States.  This same motorcycle safety course is the required course for 
United States military personnel, in order to operate a motorcycle on and off military 
installations.  One could infer that the Motorcycle Safety Foundation (MSF) course was 
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designed to allow a person to get his or her license easily after learning the basic 
operations.  More motorcycle licenses will most likely lead to more motorcycle sales 
around the country, which may translate to profits for the motorcycle manufacturers.  
One could also infer that the real motive behind the manufacturers sponsoring the MSF 
course is not safety, but to generate profit by allowing people to acquire motorcycle 
licenses easily.  As previously mentioned, the MSF claims that the BRC passing rate is 
better than 90%.  It is likely that if the MSF course is made more difficult, then a higher 
percentage of people are likely to fail.  This point is emphasized through the study 
conducted by TEAM OREGON in 2004, when the organization opted not to endorse the 
MSF’s Basic Rider Course (BRC) in its current form.   
Recently, the MSF moved to defend its position as the sole motorcycle training 
organization across the United States.  In 2006, the MSF sought legal action against 
TEAM OREGON Rider Safety Program, claiming that the Oregon organization had 
infringed on copyright material that belonged to the MSF.  A large percentage of the 
material used by the MSF had been originally developed by states before the MSF began 
using it in their courses.  The state of Oregon had originally rejected the MSF BRC under 
the premise that it did not satisfy the needs of Oregon riders.  The lawsuit enraged the 
motorcycle safety community, including motorcycle safety instructors who were 
beginning to suspect that the MSF was no longer focused on its mission statement, and 
had become an industry-sponsored profit center.  The motorcycle safety community 
viewed the lawsuit as the MSF’s attempt to stamp out any competition.  In May 2008, the 
lawsuit was settled and TEAM OREGON was authorized to institute their motorcycle 
safety program, the Basic Rider Training (BRT) (webBikeWorld, 2009).  The state of 
Idaho has taken similar actions. 
In its current form, the Basic Riders Course offered under the Motorcycle Safety 
Foundation curriculum serves its purpose, which is to create a basic rider capable of 
passing a riding test to acquire a motorcycle license, and in doing so, generates new sales 
for the motorcycle manufacturers.  The MSF’s BRC may not be the best course for sport 
bike riders if rider safety is the greatest concern. 
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The intention here is not to point the finger at the MSF or the motorcycle 
manufacturers, or to blame them for the increasing number of motorcycle accidents and 
fatalities.  It is not the motorcycle manufacturers’ responsibility to ensure that all riders 
get the required training.  After all, the car manufacturers are not responsible for ensuring 
that the drivers of their vehicles have taken driver’s education.  Therefore, it is fair to 
point out that even if the motive is to generate profits through new motorcycle licenses, 
the motorcycle manufacturers have gone a step further by at least providing a basic 
foundation for new and inexperienced riders.  One motorcycle manufacturer, Yamaha, 
offers sport bike riders the opportunity to ride, under strict supervision, on a racetrack at 
no cost with the purchase of a new Yamaha sport bike (North Eastern Sportbike 
Association, Yamaha Alliance section, n.d.).  The point is that if the MSF BRC course 
does not satisfy the needs of riders in the states of Oregon or Idaho, then the MSF BRC 
may not be the right course for military riders, either. 
1. Department of the Navy Motorcycle Policy 
Service members who desire to ride a motorcycle on a military installation or on 
public streets and highways are required to complete an approved motorcycle safety 
course.  Service members can take the motorcycle safety course offered on their parent 
installations, or take the course at any MSF affiliated certified safety school.  Both 
courses are identical and follow the MSF curriculum.  The current Navy and Marine 
Corps regulations direct all riders, regardless of the type of street bike they operate, to 
complete the MSF’s novice Basic Rider Course.  Sport bike riders are then directed to 
take the Military Sport Bike Rider Course (MSRC) within 60 days of completing the 
BRC or the purchase of a sport bike.  Other street bike operators are encouraged to 
complete the Experienced Rider Course (ERC) as soon as possible, or within 3 years of 
completing the BRC.  Additionally, Navy and Marine Corps regulations direct all 
motorcycle operators to continue enhancing their skills by completing approved follow-
on motorcycle safety training (ERC, MSRC) at least every 3 years (Department of the 
Navy, 2008, pp. 14–15). 
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Several issues arise when reviewing the current Department of the Navy 
motorcycle safety policy.  First, the Basic Rider Course has the initial benefits of helping 
a rider understand the basics of riding a motorcycle and getting comfortable with 
controlling a motorcycle at relatively low speeds.  The Military Sport Bike Rider Course 
enhances a rider’s skill level by providing drills tailored for sport bikes at higher speeds 
than the BRC. However, the speeds at which each course is conducted are still relatively 
low compared to speeds on public streets and highways.  The fear is that while both 
courses provide a good foundation, neither course may provide the necessary skill set to 
reduce the probability of a Sailor or Marine being involved in an accident.  At a certain 
comfort level (assuming 3 to 6 months of experience), riders may develop a false sense of 
security in relation to their riding skills and the capability of their sport bikes.  Based on 
Professor Hurt’s finding that “more than half the accident-involved riders had less than 5 
months experience on the accident motorcycle,” it is fair to assume that the majority of 
new sport bike riders will have their first accident within the first 3 to 6 months of the 
initial purchase date (Hurt et al., 1981, p. 417).  This includes those minor accidents that 
the rider may not report to their parent commands. 
Second, sport bike riders will gain valuable knowledge and skills when they 
complete their initial BRC and MSRC.  Repeating the course 3 years later may not add 
any value to the riders’ learning curve, because it does not build on the skills they already 
have.  The skill-set drills are simply repeated.  In this case, the MSRC can potentially 
become a check in the box for those riders who have already completed it, and potentially 
waste valuable time, manpower, and money in the process. 
Third, the ERC is simply another version of the Basic Rider Course with a few 
minor changes.  Again, as in the case the MSRC, there is very little value added to the 
skills that the riders have already acquired.  In both cases, the fear is that if riders 
perceive that they are not acquiring new skills, they simply complete the course to fulfill 
a requirement, and may not necessarily take the training seriously. 
A fourth related issue is deployment schedules.  In most cases, the military 
attempts to give Sailors and Marines at least 12 months between deployments.  Within 
those 12 months in the continental United States (CONUS), service members will spend 
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several of those months preparing for the next deployment.  A Sailor or Marine who has 
completed the BRC may desire to ride his/her motorcycle up until a week prior to a 
deployment.  As an example, let us assume that a Marine completes the BRC and MSRC 
in December 2007.  Let us also assume that this Marine will deploy from January 2008 
till July 2008.  Upon return from deployment, after being off the motorcycle for 7 
months, this Marine is not required to attend a refresher course until December of 2010.  
The main problem here is that this Marine may not recognize that his/her riding skills 
have deteriorated over the past 7 months, but still has 2 years and 5 months before he or 
she is required to attend another refresher course.  There is a very high probability that 
this Marine will want to ride his/her motorcycle after a long deployment.  The same can 
be true in the case of a Marine who has completed the ERC, deploys for a year, and 
returns with 2 years of “legal rider eligibility.”  This rider may be in a worse position than 
the rider in the first case because of the longer period off the motorcycle. The period 
following the completion of a deployment (0–60 days) is a critical time period for the 
riders in each case.  The current policy does not address the motorcycle training 
requirement at the completion of a deployment, when a rider may be most vulnerable to 
being involved in a motorcycle accident.  This may be the single most critical flaw 
associated with the current policy. 
2. Current Motorcycle Accident Trends 
Naval Safety Center motorcycle accident data indicate that over the past 10 years, 
both the Navy and Marine Corps have suffered from an increasing rate of motorcycle 
accidents and motorcycle related fatalities.  The increasing rate is based solely on the 
number of reported accidents and fatalities each fiscal year.  This trend is not only 
prevalent among military riders, but is also evident in motorcycle accident and fatalities 
across the entire United States.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
reported that motorcycle fatalities have almost doubled between 1999 and 2006, from 
2,493 in 1999, to 4,810 in 2006.  The number of motorcycle fatalities reported in 2008 
was 5,290, a 113 percent increase since 1999 (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 2008, p. 1).  Table 2 shows the nationwide motorcycle fatality statistics. 
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Table 2.   National Motorcycle Fatality Statistics (After the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, 2008, p. 1) 
National Motorcycle Fatalities by Year 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Motorcycle 
Fatalities 2,483 2,897 3,197 3,270 3,714 4,028 4,553 4,810 5,154 5,290
% Change 8.2 17.0 10.0 2.3 14.0 8.5 13.0 5.0 6.6 3.0 
 
Most states require that motorcycle riders complete the Motorcycle Safety 
Foundation’s (MSF) Basic Rider Course (BRC) to legally operate a motorcycle on the 
streets and highways.  This increasing nationwide trend may suggest an increasing 
ineffectiveness of the MSF’s BRC, especially when considering the technological 
changes motorcycles have undergone.  The main connections between military and 
civilian riders are the motorcycles they ride, and the courses riders complete to ride 
legally on public streets. 
While it is easy to concentrate on motorcycle fatalities in the Navy and Marine 
Corps, we need to focus on the bigger picture.  Fatalities are only one portion of the 
problem that directly affects manpower.  Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, fatalities 
accounted for 13.29 percent of all motorcycle accidents.  During that same period 
motorcycle accidents that resulted in permanent or partial disability injuries, or other 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents the data and the methodology used to analyze the effects of 
motorcycle accidents on manpower readiness in the Navy and Marine Corps.  The 
analysis is conducted by estimating the probability of a Sailor or Marine who has 
completed an approved motorcycle safety course being involved in an accident resulting 
in fatality or injury.  The data also is used to analyze the cost and the benefits of 
providing a motorcycle safety course that differs significantly from the current course.  
The first section discusses the data and methodology used to determine a military rider’s 
probability of getting into a motorcycle accident.  The second section discusses the data 
and methodology of calculating the costs associated with recruiting and training one 
individual for service in the Navy or Marine Corps.  The third section discusses the data 
and methodology of calculating the cost to the Navy and Marine Corps when a Sailor or 
Marine is injured or killed in a motorcycle accident. 
B. PROBABILITY ESTIMATION 
This section presents the data and methodology used to estimate the probability of 
a Marine or Sailor getting into a fatal motorcycle accident or having a motorcycle 
accident that results in injuries that keep them from performing their jobs.  This 
discussion and corresponding analysis address the primary thesis research question:  How 
do motorcycle incidents affect mission readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps? 
This section is organized in two subsections:  the data and the probability 
estimation methodology. 
1. The Data 
The author used pooled Navy and Marine Corps data provided by the Naval 
Safety Center of reported motorcycle accidents from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 
2008.  The data is separated by service, but is combined for the purpose of performing 
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regression analysis.  The data covers reported accidents that range from no injury to the 
rider to accidents resulting in rider fatality.  For each observation the data includes 
demographic information, date and location of accident, motorcycle type, mishap 
classification, and whether or not the subject had completed a motorcycle training course.  
The data also provides information on various levels of experience, and whether the 
individual Sailor or Marine involved in a motorcycle accident was absent from work for 
any particular time as a result of the accident.  The data is assembled from 1,600 
observations for the Navy and over 900 observations for the Marine Corps. 
Since the data only present reported motorcycle accidents, the total number of 
observations represents a very small fraction of the entire Navy and Marine Corps 
motorcycle community.  The probit analysis is solely dependent on a Sailor or Marine 
being involved in a motorcycle accident, and the estimated probabilities are strictly 
confined to this dataset.  The results of the probit regression are not expected to provide a 
strong representation of the entire Navy and Marine Corps motorcycle community.  
However, the probit regression results are used to provide a snapshot of the possible 
outcomes of motorcycle accidents involving Sailors and Marines. 
2. Probability Estimation Methodology 
A probit model is used in estimating the probability of a Sailor or Marine being 
involved in a motorcycle accident that results in injury or fatality.  A probit model is a 
non-linear regression model where the predicted values of the dependent variables are 
strictly constrained between 0 and 1.  It is used to estimate the probability of a dependent 
variable (y) occurring given that certain observed independent variables (x1, x2, x3,…xk) 
exist.  A probit model is written as:  P(y=1|x) = Φ(xβ), where Φ is a cumulative standard 
normal probability distribution, and (xβ) is the product of the parameters and the 
observed independent variables (Wooldridge, 2006, pp. 575–576).  The derivation of the 




Pr(y=1|x) = G(β0 + xβ), where 0<G(z)<1. 
G(z) = Φ(z) ≡ ∫φ(v)dv, where G is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. 
φ(z) = (2π)-1/2exp(-z2/2)), where φ(z) is the standard normal density. 
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A probit model utilizes a maximum likelihood estimate, which is based on a 
simple principle:  choose parameters that would maximize the probability of our 
dependent variables.  In the case of this thesis, the separate dependent variables are 
fatality and miss work as a result of a motorcycle accident.  By utilizing a probit model, 
the intent was to use the observed independent variables to estimate the likelihood of a 
Sailor or Marine being killed or seriously injured if he or she is involved in a motorcycle 
accident.  The probit model is also intended to capture the role each observed 
independent variable plays in reaching the final probability of fatality or injury if a Sailor 
or Marine is involved in a motorcycle accident.  Each observed independent variable 
affects the dependent variables in different degrees.  The probit regression will show the 
partial effect, or change, that each independent variable has on the outcome of the 
independent variables. 
For this probability estimation, two separate probit equations are developed.  The 
first is used in determining if a Sailor or Marine who has completed an approved 
motorcycle safety course is involved in a motorcycle accident, what will be the 
probability of that Sailor or Marine being killed.  The second equation is used in 
determining if a Sailor or Marine who has completed an approved motorcycle safety 
course is involved in a motorcycle accident, what will be the probability of missing work 
due to injuries.  The specifications for the theoretical models to estimate the probabilities 






The variables for each model and their descriptions are found in Table 3. 
 
where all variables are defined in Table 3 
 
 
P(Fatality | x) = G(β0 + β1(sport_bike) + β2(trng_cmpltd) + β3(summer) + β4(spring) 
  + β5(south) + β6(west) + β7(jr_offcr) + β8(jr_enlsd) + β9(staff_enlsd) 
  + β10(age) + β11(fy_2008)) 
 
P(Miss Work | x) = G(β0 + β1(sport_bike) + β2(trng_cmpltd) + β3(summer)  
      + β4(spring) + β5(south) + β6(west) + β7(jr_offcr) + β8(jr_enlsd) 
      + β9(staff_enlsd) + β10(age) + β11(fy_2008)) 
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Table 3.   Description of Probit Model Variables 
Definition of Variable 
Dependent 
Variables Variable Description 
Variable 
Type 
Fatality Fatal injury as a result of a motorcycle accident. Binary 
Miss Work 
Missed work for a particular amount of time due to 
injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident.  Category 
includes fatalities, injuries, and disabilities. 
Binary 
      
Independent 
Variables Variable Description 
Variable 
Type 
Sport Bike Sport bike involved in the motorcycle accident. Binary 
Training Completed 
Approved motorcycle safety training course was 
completed. Binary 
Summer Accident occurred in the Summer season. Binary 
Spring Accident occurred in the Spring season. Binary 
South Accident occurred in a southern location. Binary 
West Accident occurred in a western location. Binary 
Junior Officer Service member involved in accident between the pay-grade of O-1 to O-3. Binary 
Junior Enlisted Service member involved in accident between the pay-grade of E-1 to E-5. Binary 
Senior Enlisted Service member involved in accident between the pay-grade of E-6 to E-9. Binary 
Age Service members' age. Interval 
Fiscal Year Fiscal year of accident occurrence. Binary 
 
C. SERVICE INVESTMENT COST ESTIMATION 
This section presents the data and methodology used to estimate the cost of 
recruiting and training Sailors and Marines for their various military occupational 
specialties (MOSs).   
1. The Data 
Navy and Marine Corps commands provided the costs associated with recruiting 
and basic training.  A 2004 cost-benefit analysis, conducted by the Center for Naval 




The author selected six military occupational specialties for each service from the CNA 
study that provided a wide range of cost estimates for training individual Sailors and 
Marines. 
2. Investment Cost Estimate 
The cost of training Sailors and Marines for their military occupational specialties 
in 2008 was updated using a Consumer Price Index (CPI) equation.  The CPI equation 
converted the 2004 constant dollar cost for the MOSs specified in the CNA study, to 
constant dollar costs for 2008.  In determining the total investment for the selected 
MOSs, the 2008 training costs is added to the 2008 recruiting costs.  Formula 1 shows the 




Elements of the Total Individual Investment equation are as follows: 
 Rc:   Recruiting cost for 2008 
 Mc:  MOS cost for 2004 
 PI08:  Consumer Price Index for 2008 (215.3) 
 PI04:  Consumer Price Index for 2004 (188.9) 
D. FATALITY AND HOSPITALIZATION COST ESTIMATION 
This section presents the data and methodology used to estimate the cost 
associated with fatality and hospitalization as a result of a motorcycle accident. 
1. The Data 
The author utilizes the accident data from the Naval Safety Center, coupled with 
life insurance information from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, and hospitalization 
costs from prior motorcycle accident studies to calculate the equivalent monetary cost for 
 
 
Total Individual Investment for 2008 = Rc + [Mc *(PI08 / PI04)] 
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motorcycle injuries and fatalities in fiscal year 2008 for the Navy and Marine Corps.  The 
hospitalization costs in the motorcycle accident studies are based on an average ten-day 
hospital stay. 
2. Fatality and Hospitalization Cost Methodology 
In estimating the costs associated with motorcycle fatalities, the author first 
assumes the maximum life insurance payment for each Sailor or Marine killed in a 
motorcycle accident.  In estimating hospitalization costs associated with motorcycle 
injuries, the author utilizes an average cost based on prior motorcycle crash studies 
conducted in 1989 by the state of Washington.  The hospitalization cost figures are 
converted from 1989 constant dollars to 2008 constant dollars utilizing the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) equation.  Formula 2 shows the equation used in determining the total 




Elements of the Total Fatality & Injury Cost equation are as follows: 
 F08:  Number of fatalities in 2008 
 LImax:  Life insurance maximum payment 
 J08:  Number of injuries in 2008 
 H08:  Average motorcycle injury hospitalization cost in 2008, derived from 
the average cost in 1989. [ H08 = avg. cost 1989 * (PI08 / PI89)] 
 PI08:  Consumer Price Index for 2008 (215.3) 
 PI04:  Consumer Price Index for 1989 (124.0) 
 T08:  Number of traumatic injuries in 2008 
 C08:  TSGLI cost of traumatic injuries 
 
Total Fatality & Injury Cost = (F08 * LImax) + (J08 * H08) + (T08 * C08) 
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E. OTHER DATA 
Additionally, a great amount of information was obtained through interviews with 
motorcycle industry officials, rider safety school owners and instructors, and several 
former world champion racers.  This information is utilized to compare the value of a 
traditional MSF safety course versus a non-traditional track oriented motorcycle course. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter described the data and methodology used to perform 
analysis related to how motorcycle accidents affect the Navy and Marine Corps in terms 
of manpower and financial cost.  The purpose of this chapter is to present the analysis 
and the results that will lead to a better understanding of how motorcycle accidents affect 
manpower readiness.  Additionally, this chapter analyzes the cost and the benefits 
associated with maintaining the current motorcycle safety courses versus introducing a 
non-traditional motorcycle safety course.  In the first section, motorcycle accident data is 
analyzed to determine the probability of a Sailor or Marine being involved in a 
motorcycle accident that will result in injuries, fatal or otherwise, that prevent him from 
performing his job.  The second section examines the costs associated with recruiting and 
training Sailors and Marines, and the equivalent hospital costs associated with a Sailor or 
Marine injured in a motorcycle accident.  The final section compares the cost of  
traditional motorcycle safety courses that Sailors and Marines are directed to attend to the 
cost of some of the non-traditional motorcycle safety courses that are available 
nationwide. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Navy and Marine Corps dedicate much of their time, effort and money to 
training and retaining Marines and Sailors to have the manpower necessary to defend our 
nation and fight our nation’s wars.  The rising cost of manpower combined with the rising 
trend in motorcycle accidents and fatalities places both the Navy and the Marine Corps in 
a losing situation. 
The Naval Safety Center reports that just over 3,900 separate units throughout the 
Department of the Navy combine for an approximate total of 48,158 military riders.  
Table 4 shows the breakdown of riders for the Navy and Marine Corps. 
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Table 4.   Department of the Navy Motorcycle Rider Summary (After the Naval Safety 
Center, 2008) 
Marine Corps Motorcycle Riders Summary 
Description Total Percent (%) 
Marine Sport Bike Riders Reported 9856 55.3 
Marine Standard Bike Riders Reported 7965 44.7 
Total Marine Riders Reported 17821 100 
*751 Marine UICs Reported    
Navy Motorcycle Riders Summary 
Description Total Percent (%) 
Navy Sport Bike Riders Reported 11767 37.8 
Navy Standard Bike Riders Reported 18570 61.2 
Total Navy Riders Reported 30337 100 
*3179 Navy UICs Reported    
Department of the Navy Summary 
Description Total Percent (%) 
Total Sport Bike Riders 21623 44.9 
Total Standard Bike Riders 26535 55.1 
Total Dept. of the Navy Riders 48158 100 
*3930 Total UICs Reported     
From the Naval Safety Center 
 
Table 4 also shows a disproportionate percentage of sport bike riders in the 
Marine Corps when compared to sport bike riders in the Navy.  This disproportion could 
be due to the recruiting and retention practices of each service.  The Marine Corps is the 
younger branch of service in terms of personnel recruited because of more stringent age 
requirements and because of the Marine Corps’ mission. 
Only a very small percentage of the total number of registered riders in the Navy 
and Marine Corps are involved in motorcycle accidents annually.  In fiscal year 2008, the 
Marine Corps had a total of 172 reported motorcycle accidents, while the Navy reported a 
total of 260 motorcycle accidents.  Reported accidents include any documented accident 
involving a motorcycle regardless of the final outcome.  Separately, these two figures 
account for approximately 1 percent of the total number of riders in each service.  For 
fiscal year 2008, sport bike rider fatalities accounted for a disproportionately high 
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87 percent of all reported motorcycle fatalities in the Navy and Marine Corps.  In 
comparison to the total number of motorcycle riders in the Department of the Navy, this 
extremely small percentage of riders are gaining the most attention, and may be the 
services’ most expensive liability.  The Navy and Marine Corps are not only losing 
Sailors and Marines to motorcycle accidents, but are also losing valuable manpower, 
money, and social credibility in the entire process. 
Motorcycle riders in the Navy and Marine Corps cover a wide demographic 
range.  The data from the Naval Safety Center provide demographic information 
including rider age, rank, and rider experience.  The data also provide information on 
date and time of accident, location of accident, motorcycle type, rider injury 
classification, and whether or not there were lost work days associated with the accident. 
C. PRELIMINARY PROBABILITY ESTIMATES 
In this section of the analysis, the author focuses on finding the probability that a 
motorcycle rider who gets into an accident will have an injury (fatal or otherwise) that 
prohibits him from performing his job for any particular period of time.  This analysis 
utilizes a probit model to determine the probability that an accident will be incapacitating.  
The variables and a description of each variable are listed in Table 3, in Chapter III. 
The preliminary probit models for motorcycle fatality and injury requiring time 








P(Fatality | x) = G (β0 + β1(sport_bike) + β2(trng_cmpltd) + β3(spring) + β4(summer)  
  + β5(south) + β6(west) + β7(jr_enlsd) + β8(staff_enlsd) + β9(age)) 
 
P(Miss Work | x) = G (β0 + β1(sport_bike) + β2(trng_cmpltd) + β3(spring) + β4(summer)
        + β5(south) + β6(west) + β7(jr_enlsd) + β8(staff_enlsd) + β9(age)) 
 
Where all variables are defined in Table 3. 
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D. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1. The Preliminary Probit Model 
The results from the preliminary probit model indicate that the current motorcycle 
safety training does not significantly decrease a Sailor’s or Marine’s chance of being 
killed, given that he or she is involved in a motorcycle accident, but actually shows a 
slight increase of approximately 2.8 percentage points.  Sailors and Marines who ride 
sport bikes, rather than other motorcycles, increase their chances of a fatal accident by 
approximately 5.8 percentage points.  The overall results from the preliminary probit 
regression model indicate that a Sailor or Marine who has completed an approved 
motorcycle safety course still has a 10.1 percent probability of being killed if he or she is 
involved in a motorcycle accident.  Table 5 presents the results for the Fatality 
preliminary regression. 
Table 5.   Preliminary Probit Model for Fatality 
Fatality Partial Effect Std. Err. z 
Sport Bike 0.0582222 0.0167957 3.07* 
Training Complete 0.0285943 0.0157753 1.78 
Spring -0.0057535 0.0195361 -0.29 
Summer 0.0233045 0.019469 1.24 
South -0.0505337 0.0249168 -2.02* 
West -0.0477358 0.0241825 -1.92 
Jr. Enlisted -0.0050888 0.0381991 -0.13 
Sr. Enlisted 0.0010761 0.0376635 0.03 
Age -0.0009198 0.0018177 -0.51 
obs. P    .1067568  Number of obs 1480 
pred. P    .1014732  (at x-bar) Pseudo R2 0.0221 
*Significant at 1% 
 
The results of the preliminary probit regression model for the Miss Work variable 
indicate that a Sailor or Marine who has completed approved motorcycle training and 
who is involved in an accident reduces his or her chance of being injured by 
approximately 10 percentage points.  In this preliminary model, the fact of whether the 
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rider was operating a sport bike is negligible.  However, considering all the variables 
together, the preliminary model indicates that a Sailor or Marine who is involved in a 
motorcycle accident has an overall 87.8 percent chance of being absent from work due to 
injuries sustained in that accident.  Table 6 presents the results for the Miss Work 
preliminary regression. 
Table 6.   Preliminary Probit Model for Miss Work 
Miss Work Partial Effect Std. Err. z 
Sport Bike 0.0021441 0.0207349 0.1 
Training Complete -0.1001976 0.0165848 -5.7* 
Spring -0.0386854 0.0222692 -1.82 
Summer 0.0323075 0.0194146 1.59 
South -0.0996443 0.0369375 -2.71* 
West -0.0810379 0.0397474 -2.11* 
Jr. Enlisted 0.0021863 0.0404314 0.05 
Sr. Enlisted 0.022791 0.0370119 0.59 
Age 0.0039263 0.0019886 1.97* 
obs. P    .8648649  Number of obs 1480 
pred. P    .8787612  (at x-bar) Pseudo R2 0.0552 
*Significant at 1% 
 
The author suspected that the Rank variables (junior enlisted, senior enlisted) and 
the Age variable may be correlated, affecting each other during regression calculations.  
The probit models were adjusted first by excluding the Age variable in one regression, 
and excluding the Rank variables in a second regression.  The intent of the separate 
regressions is to see the effect the Rank and the Age variables had on each other, and on 
the overall Fatality and Miss Work probabilities. 
2. Probit Regressions Including Rank Variables 
The results of the probit regression including the Rank variables, and excluding 
Age show that the most significant variable with regard to motorcycle fatality is the Sport 
Bike variable, where a Sailor or Marine who is involved in a motorcycle accident has a 
5.8 percentage point higher chance of being killed in the accident if he or she operates a 
sport bike.  The Training Complete variable is marginally significant and shows an 
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increased 2.6 percentage points chance of motorcycle fatality for a Sailor or Marine who 
has completed an approved motorcycle course and is involved in a motorcycle accident.  
Both Rank variables are statistically insignificant with regard to motorcycle fatality.  
Considering all the variables in this regression, the overall probability of a Sailor or 
Marine being killed if he or she is involved in a motorcycle accident remains unchanged 
at 10.1percent.  Table 7 shows the results of the probit regression for Fatality (excluding 
Age). 
Table 7.   Probit Model Results for Fatality (Excluding Age) 
Fatality Partial Effect Std. Err. z 
Sport Bike 0.0586761 0.0163026 3.18* 
Training Complete 0.0261182 0.0156946 1.64 
Summer 0.0276157 0.0179603 1.59 
West -0.0086271 0.0158495 -0.54 
Jr. Enlisted 0.0057284 0.0342116 0.17 
Sr. Enlisted 0.0078066 0.0381996 0.21 
obs. P    .1058981  Number of obs 1492 
pred. P    .1016707  (at x-bar) Pseudo R2 0.0175 
*Significant at 1% 
 
The results of the probit regression including the Rank variables, and excluding 
Age, show that the most significant variable with regard to missing work as a result of a 
motorcycle accident is the Training Complete variable.  In this case, a Sailor or Marine 
who has completed approved motorcycle training and is involved in a motorcycle 
accident has a 10.3 percentage point lower chance of being injured. 
The Summer variable in this probit regression is statistically significant, and 
indicates an increased chance of 4.5 percentage points of a Sailor or Marine being injured 
if he or she is involved in a motorcycle accident.  The Rank variables again play no 




Considering all the variables, a Sailor or Marine involved in a motorcycle 
accident has an overall 87.6 percent probability of missing work due to injuries sustained 
in the accident.  Table 8 shows the results of the probit regression for the Miss Work 
variable (excluding Age). 
Table 8.   Probit Model Results for Miss Work (Excluding Age) 
Miss Work Partial Effect Std. Err. z 
Sport Bike -0.0042019 0.0201445 -0.21 
Training Complete -0.1026406 0.0165762 -5.82* 
Summer 0.0454398 0.0174244 2.45* 
West 0.0105548 0.0172279 0.61 
Jr. Enlisted -0.0332744 0.0338644 -0.94 
Sr. Enlisted 0.0287518 0.036397 0.75 
obs. P    .8659517  Number of obs 1492 
pred. P     .876118  (at x-bar) Pseudo R2 0.0412 
*Significant at 1% 
 
3. Probit Regression Including the Age Variable 
The results of the probit regression including the Age variable, and excluding 
Rank variables, show that the most significant variable with regard to motorcycle fatality 
is the Sport Bike variable, where a Sailor or Marine who is in an accident has an 
increased probability of 5.8 percentage points of being killed if he or she operates a sport 
bike rather than other motorcycles.  The Training Complete variable remains marginally 
significant and shows a 2.9 percentage points increased probability of being killed for 
Sailors or Marines who have completed an approved motorcycle course and are involved 
in a motorcycle accident.  Both Rank variables remain statistically insignificant with 
regard to a Sailor or Marine missing work due to an injury accident.  The Age variable is 
statistically insignificant with regard to motorcycle fatality.  Considering all the variables 
in this probit regression, the overall probability of a Sailor or Marine being killed if he or 
she is involved in a motorcycle accident still remains relatively unchanged at 10.5 
percent. Table 9 shows the results of the probit regression for Fatality (excluding Rank). 
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Table 9.   Probit Model Results for Fatality (Excluding Rank) 
Fatality Partial Effect Std. Err. z 
Sport Bike 0.0583641 0.0164289 3.15* 
Training Complete 0.0296266 0.01541 1.89 
Summer 0.019188 0.0174616 1.13 
West -0.0086139 0.0156491 -0.55 
Age 0.000289 0.0013203 0.22 
obs. P    .1088608  Number of obs 1580 
pred. P    .1050916  (at x-bar) Pseudo R2 0.0155 
*Significant at 1% 
 
The results of the probit regression that includes the Age variable, and excludes 
the Rank variables, show that the most significant variable with regard to missing work as 
a result of a motorcycle accident is the Training Complete variable.  In this case, a Sailor 
or Marine who has completed motorcycle training and is involved in an accident 
decreases his or her probability of being injured by approximately 8.9 percentage points. 
The Summer variable in this probit regression is statistically significant, and 
indicates an increased probability of 4.1 percentage points of a Sailor or Marine being 
injured if involved in a motorcycle accident.  In this probit regression the Age variable is 
statistically significant and indicates a minute 0.56 percentage point increased probability 
of a Sailor or Marine missing work due to a motorcycle accident. 
As in the preliminary probit regression model, and the regression model that 
included the Rank variables, this probit regression indicates that a Sailor or Marine 
involved in a motorcycle accident has an overall 87.5 percent probability of missing work 
due to injuries sustained in a motocycle accident. Table 10 shows the results of the probit 







Table 10.   Probit Model Results for Miss Work (Excluding Rank) 
Miss Work Partial Effect Std. Err. z 
Sport Bike 0.0137461 0.0207118 0.68 
Training Complete -0.088603 0.0162673 -5.19* 
Summer 0.0405805 0.0171181 2.25* 
West 0.0173919 0.0167353 1.03 
Age 0.0056163 0.0014673 3.79* 
obs. P    .8658228  Number of obs 1580 
pred. P    .8750279  (at x-bar) Pseudo R2 0.0373 
*Significant at 1% 
 
4. Probit Regression Summary 
The results of the probit regression models indicate that the type of motorcycle 
ridden, completion of an approved motorcycle safety course, season (time of year), 
location, and age are just some of the variables that may play a part in determining the 
probability that Sailors or Marines, if involved in motorcycle accidents, suffer an injury 
or fatality.   
There are very few variables that the Navy or Marine Corps can control in this 
regard, with the most influential variable being the type of approved motorcycle training 
Sailors and Marines are offered.  The regression results indicate a 2.0 percentage points 
increased probability of fatality and only a 10.0 percentage points reduced probability of 
injury if a Sailor or Marine who has completed an approved motorcycle safety course is 
involved in a motorcycle accident.  However, it is important to note that because we have 
no data on how the probability of an accident varies with training, the effects of the 
current motorcycle safety training on the probability of having a motorcycle accident 
cannot be deduced. 
Although TEAM OREGON claims that the MSF’s BRC may not be an 
appropriate course for novice riders, the data and the results of the probit regressions 
are unable to provide a distinct conclusion to support that claim.  More research in 
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this area is necessary to determine the true effects motorcycle training has on the 
probability of being involved in a motorcycle accident. 
E. ACCIDENT DATA BREAKDOWN 
Since fiscal years 2000 through 2008, Navy and Marine Corps data indicate that a 
large portion of those Sailors or Marines involved in motorcycle accidents had injuries 
that kept them out of work for various periods of time (lost time, disabilities and fatalities 
are included in this figure and account for hours of manpower).  Table 11 shows the 
results of reported motorcycle accidents for the Navy and Marine Corps from fiscal year 
2000 through fiscal year 2008. 
Table 11.   Department of the Navy Motorcycle Accident Outcome 
Navy Motorcycle Accident Results FY00 - FY08 
Accident Result Frequency Percent (%) 
Fatal Injury 209 12.38 
Lost Time Injury 1,321 78.26 
Disabling Injury 58 3.44 
Full Duty 100 5.93 
Marine Motorcycle Accident Results FY00 - FY08 
Accident Result Frequency Percent (%) 
Fatal Injury 126 13.29 
Lost Time Injury 544 57.38 
Disabling Injury 28 2.95 
Full Duty 250 26.37 
 
The data also indicate that the majority of the Sailors and Marines involved in 
motorcycle accidents are in the 18- to 23-year-old age group, predominantly first term 
service members.  Sailors and Marine in the 18- to 23-year-old age group age group are 
followed closely by service members in the 24- to 29-year-old age group.   These two age 
groups alone are a mixture of first term and career service members.  Combined they 
make up just over 82 percent of all motorcycle accidents reported between fiscal year 
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2000 and fiscal year 2008.  Figure 2 shows motorcycle accidents by age group for the 
Department of the Navy between fiscal years 2000 through 2008. 
 
Figure 2.   Navy and Marine Corps Motorcycle Accidents by Age Group 
Sailors and Marines in these two age groups are of particular interest because they 
comprise mostly those service members who have completed military occupational 
specialty (MOS) training and are completing their first fleet assignment, or Sailors and 
Marines who reenlisted, and may have taken a reenlistment bonus.  These are service 
members that the Navy and Marine Corps have invested in through training and financial 
compensation, but will be unable to use to their full potential, owing to the fact that they 
will have to be out of work for various periods of time due to a multitude of injuries 
received as a result of being involved in motorcycle accidents. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COST ESTIMATES 
The Navy and Marine Corps both have requirements for various technical and non-
technical MOSs.  Depending on a Sailor’s or Marine’s occupational specialty, training length 
can vary from 4 weeks to 24 months.  Traditionally, the training for technical MOSs is much 
longer than for non-technical MOSs, and in most cases much more costly to the services than 
training for non-technical MOSs.  The Navy and Marine Corps invest in their Sailors and 
Marines with the assumption that Sailors and Marines will be present to perform their jobs to 
the best of their abilities throughout the length of their service obligations. 
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1. Individual Recruiting and Training Costs 
In determining how much it costs the services to recruit and train someone, individual 
costs must be tracked from the moment that person expresses interest in the Navy or Marine 
Corps, through to the completion of his or her primary MOS (PMOS) schools.  The total 
investment per individual includes all monetized costs recognized by the services. 
As of fiscal year 2008, Marine Corps Recruiting Command estimates that the 
Marine Corps spends $10,246 on each individual recruited for service in the Marine 
Corps (Marine Corps Recruiting Command, personal communication, March 23, 2009).  
The Navy’s 2008 recruiting cost estimate is approximately $13,500 for an individual 
enlisting in the Navy (without a recruiting bonus).  These estimates cover the cost of the 
period from when an individual first expresses interest in the Navy or Marine Corps, until 
that individual is standing on the yellow footprints at the Marine Corps Recruiting Depot 
or the Navy’s Recruit Training Command (RTC) (Sumrall & Gualandi, 2008). 
Unfortunately, neither the Navy nor Marine Corps collects compiled cost 
information for individual PMOSs.  For this thesis, the author uses an earlier study, 
conducted in 2004 by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) for cost estimate calculations 
for each PMOS.  These cost estimates include the costs for basic training, personnel cost, 
and MOS schoolhouse cost.  The CNA study determines the cost estimates as follows. 
The 2002 Critical Indicators Study developed a methodology for 
calculating the average time it takes to become occupationally qualified 
and provided time-to-train days for each PMOS. Past research indicated 
that training costs were directly related to training time: training costs 
could be approximated by multiplying the number of days in training by 
daily base pay for the trainee and by a scale factor. Thus, we monetize the 
number of training days for training costs. 
The “time to train” is the time between the beginning of bootcamp (yellow 
footprints)1 and assignment to a primary PMOS. It includes time spent in 
training, as well as time spent waiting for training to begin, transit time, and so 
on. These calculations were for new recruits and included 122 days that lateral 
                                                 
1 The yellow footprints are silhouettes of shoes painted on the ground in yellow paint.  Traditionally, 
they are organized as though in military formation and are located in a recruit staging area.  The yellow 
footprints signify the beginning of a recruit’s journey to becoming a Marine. 
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movers would not be required to complete (MCRD, boot leave, and Marine 
combat training (MCT)) (Center for Naval Analysis, p. 80). 
For the purpose of analysis, six cost estimates were selected for six separate 
Marine Corps PMOSs ranging from lower to higher cost of training.  The PMOSs were 
selected to show diversity in MOS selection, and to have a wide range of cost estimates 
of various PMOSs for analysis. 
Since the PMOS cost estimates in the previous CNA study only focused on 
Marine Corps occupational specialties, six specialties also were selected from the Marine 
PMOS list to represent occupational specialties that are equivalent to the Navy’s 
occupational ratings (jobs).  The analysis assumes that since the Navy and Marine Corps 
frequently combine to attend the same service schools for numerous military 
occupational specialties, then the “time to train” is similar for both Marines and Sailors in 
similar occupational specialties.  Hence, the cost of training an enlisted Marine for a 
particular occupational specialty is similar to the cost of training an enlisted Sailor in that 
same occupational rating.  Tables 12 and 13 show Navy and Marine Corps occupational 
specialties, their equivalent training days, training cost estimate for calendar year 2004, 
and an updated estimated training cost estimate for calendar year 2008.  Using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), Formula 3 shows the equation used to convert 2004 





 Rc:   Recruiting cost for 2008 
 Mc:  MOS cost for 2004 
 PI08:  Consumer Price Index for 2008 (215.3) 




Total Individual Investment for 2008 = Rc + [Mc *(PI08 / PI04)] 
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Table 12.   Navy Individual Investment Cost Estimate (After the Center for Naval 
Analysis, 2004, pp. 109–122) 





Training Cost per 
Graduate in 2004 $ 
Training Cost per 



















Control 365 $68,967 $78,607  $92,107 
Air Traffic 
Controller 426 $97,128 $110,704  $124,204 
Russian 
Cryptologist 614 $123,522 $140,787  $154,287 
 
Table 13.   Marine Corps Individual Investment Cost Estimate (After the Center for 
Naval Analysis, 2004, pp. 109–122) 





Training Cost per 
Graduate in 2004 $ 
Training Cost per 




Basic Rifleman 72 $12,960 $14,771  $25,017 
M1 A1 Tank 
Crewman 114 $20,266 $23,099  $33,345 
Aircraft 
Maintenance 
GSE 277 $48,832 $55,657  $65,903 
Reconnaissance 
Man 322 $68,826 $78,446  $88,692 
Helicopter 
Crew Chief 288 $82,080 $93,553  $103,799 
Arabic 
Cryptologist 712 $143,238 $163,259  $173,505 
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2. Motorcycle Accident Cost 
The Navy and Marine Corps invest millions of dollars in training Sailors and 
Marines for their various military occupational specialties.  Sailors and Marines are 
expected to perform their jobs to the best of their abilities, once they have completed their 
training, for the duration of their military contracts.  If a Sailor or Marine is injured in a 
motorcycle accident prior to the completion of his or her military contract, that Sailor or 
Marine may not be able to perform his or her job for any particular amount of time 
(usually the time it takes for them to recover).  In the worst-case scenario, due to the 
severity of the injuries, the Sailor or Marine may be unable to complete his or her 
military contract.  Fatalities and disabilities create a shortage of manpower, and 
necessitate recruiting and training replacement personnel.  Recruiting and training 
replacement personnel creates an additional expense for both services. 
Over the past several years, the military in general has focused on the number of 
annual motorcycle fatalities.  Motorcycle fatalities usually command much attention 
because of the catastrophic nature of those events.  However, fatalities are just one 
portion of the overall problem.  The data from the Naval Safety Center indicate that fewer 
than 20 percent of motorcycle accidents reported annually resulted in rider fatalities, 
while a very large percentage of motorcycle accidents involving Sailors and Marines 
resulted in incapacitating injuries.  Between fiscal years 1999 and 2008, the Navy had 
over 1600 reported motorcycle accidents.  Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, the 
Marine Corps reported over 970 motorcycle accidents.  The Naval Safety Center data 
indicate that the Navy and Marine Corps reported a total of 311 motorcycle fatalities, and 
2,286 motorcycle injuries resulting in lost work time, between fiscal years 2000 through 
2008. 
a. Life Insurance Costs 
While neither the Navy nor Marine Corps tracks the costs associated with 
motorcycle accidents, a cost analysis was examined using data from the Naval Safety 
Center, Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (SGLI), information from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, and hospitalization costs information from various 
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motorcycle injury cost studies.  Cost analysis was utilized to determine the monetary 
equivalent of the amount of funds the Department of Defense would have paid as a result 
of fatalities and injuries due to motorcycle accidents in the Navy and Marine Corps.  For 
the purpose of this analysis, observations from fiscal year 2008 were utilized as being the 
most recent and complete.  Table 14 shows the classification of motorcycle accident 
injuries, frequencies and percentages for the Navy and Marine Corps in fiscal year 2008. 
Table 14.   Motorcycle Accident Outcome for Fiscal Year 2008 
Marine FY 2008 Injury Summary 
Injury Freq. Percent Cum. 
Fatal Injury 25 15.24 15.24 
First Aid Injury 4 2.44 17.68 
Lost Time Injury 96 58.54 76.22 
No Injury 37 22.56 98.78 
Permanent Total Disability 0 0 0 
Permanent Partial Disability 2 1.22 100 
Total 164 100   
Navy FY 2008 Injury Summary 
Injury Freq. Percent Cum. 
Fatal Injury 33 12.74 12.74 
First Aid Injury 10 3.86 16.6 
Lost Time Injury 206 79.54 96.14 
No Injury 3 1.16 97.3 
Permanent Total Disability 0 0 0 
Permanent Partial Disability 7 2.7 100 
Total 259 100   
 
The Department of Veterans Affairs describes Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance 
(SGLI) as follows: 
SGLI is a program of low cost group life insurance for service members 
on active duty, ready reservists, members of the National Guard, members 
of the Commissioned Corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and the Public Health Service, cadets and midshipmen of 
the four service academies, and members of the Reserve Officer Training 
Corps. 
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SGLI coverage is available in $50,000 increments up to the maximum of 
$400,000. 
SGLI provides group term life insurance. When you die, money will be 
paid to the person (persons) you designate to receive the insurance. The 
beneficiary can use this money to pay expenses related to your death or 
invest the money to help replace your salary. Since SGLI is term 
insurance, it does not have cash or loan values and it does not pay 
dividends. (United States Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.) 
SGLI will have to pay up to $400,000 in the event a Sailor or Marine is 
killed in a motorcycle accident.  Along with SGLI benefits, Sailors and Marines involved 
in an accident may qualify for payments through the Traumatic Injury Protection Under 
Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program.  The Department of Veterans 
Affairs describes TSGLI as follows: 
The Traumatic Injury Protection Under Servicemembers' Group Life 
Insurance (TSGLI) program is a rider to Servicemember’s Group Life 
Insurance (SGLI). The TSGLI rider provides for payment to service 
members who are severely injured (on or off duty) as the result of a 
traumatic event and suffer a loss that qualifies for payment under TSGLI. 
TSGLI payments are designed to help traumatically injured service 
members and their families with financial burdens associated with 
recovering from a severe injury. TSGLI payments range from $25,000 to 
$100,000 based on the qualifying loss suffered.  
TSGLI coverage will pay a benefit of between $25,000 and $100,000 
depending on the loss directly resulting from the traumatic injury 
Every member who has SGLI also has TSGLI effective December 1, 
2005. 
TSGLI coverage is automatic for those insured under basic SGLI and 
cannot be declined. The only way to decline TSGLI is to decline basic 
SGLI coverage. (United States Department of Veterans Affairs, n.d.) 
TSGLI provides the opportunity for a Sailor or Marine who sustains a 
traumatic injury or loss due to a motorcycle accident to place a claim that qualifies him or 
her for payments up to $100,000, depending on the injury.   
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The following assumptions are made in estimating the monetary cost of 
fatalities and injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident for Sailors and Marines. 
 Each service member opted to select the maximum SGLI coverage of 
$400,000. 
 Each service member involved in a fatal accident died at the scene. 
 Each service member covered under SGLI is automatically covered under 
TSGLI for up to $100,000. 
 TSGLI was paid in fiscal year 2008 due to permanent partial disability 
injuries sustained by Sailors and Marines. 
 Since the nature of the partial disability injuries sustained by service 
members is unknown, assume that a $50,000 payment was paid on behalf 
of the injured Sailor or Marine. 
In terms of permanent total or permanent partial disability injuries, a 
service member who must be removed from service because of a disability, in most cases, 
will be compensated with a percentage of his or her military pay for the rest of his or her 
life.  While these compensations could add up to significant costs to the Department of 
Defense over the long run, studying this long run compensation cost is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
b. Hospitalization Costs 
The next portion of the analysis is to determine the hospitalization cost for 
injuries sustained due to motorcycle accidents.  For the purpose of this analysis, only 
injuries that require hospitalization are considered.  Fatal injury accidents are excluded 
from the hospitalization cost analysis due to lack of information on whether the 
motorcycle operator was killed at the scene of the accident or died later in the hospital.  
First-aid injury accidents and no injury accidents are excluded from the hospitalization 
cost analysis since the financial responsibility to the military is negligible. 
A study conducted by Rowland et al. (1996), based on motorcycle 
accident injuries in the state of Washington for the year 1989, estimates that the average 
cost of hospitalization for riders involved in a motorcycle accident was $12,689  
(± $1302) per person if the riders were wearing helmets.  The same study estimates that 
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hospitalization costs for riders who were not wearing helmets at the time of the accident 
were $16,460 (± $1971) per person.  The estimates in this study are in 1989 dollars 
(Rowland et al., 1996, p. 43).  The data from the Naval Safety Center differentiates 
between riders with and without helmets at the time of accident.  However, because of 
missing data, riders without helmets at the time of the accidents could not be determined.  
Therefore, only the cost estimate for riders wearing helmets was utilized in the hospital 
cost analysis.  The average cost of hospitalization for riders in 2008 was estimated at 
$22,032. 
c. Total Cost of Motorcycle Accidents 
In order to estimate the equivalent cost for motorcycle accidents reported 




Table 15 illustrates the total motorcycle accident cost estimates calculation 
for fiscal year 2008. 
Table 15.   Fiscal Year 2008 Motorcycle Injury Cost Estimates 
Marine FY 2008 Injury Cost Estimate 
Injury Freq. Cost Total 
Fatal Injury 25 $400,000 $10,000,000  
Lost Time Injury 98 $22,032  $2,159,136 
Permanent Total Disability 0 0 0 
Permanent Partial Disability * 2 $50,000  $100,000  
Total 164   $12,259,136  
Navy FY 2008 Injury Cost Estimate 
Injury Freq. Cost Total 
Fatal Injury 33 $400,000 $13,200,000  
Lost Time Injury 213 $22,032  $4,692,816  
Permanent Total Disability 0 0 0 
Permanent Partial Disability * 7 $50,000  $350,000  
Total 259   $18,242,816  
*Disability is also included in Lost Time Injury category 
 Motorcycle Accident Cost Estimate FY 2008 = (No. of fatalities * $400,000) + (No. of 
injury accidents * $22,032) + (No. of traumatic injuries *$50,000)  
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The estimates in Table 15 do not include the cost of training the individual 
Sailor or Marine for his or her primary military occupational specialty (PMOS). The data 
from the Naval Safety Center does not specify the MOSs of the Sailors or Marines in the 
dataset.  In order to provide a snapshot of motorcycle accident cost combined with the 
cost of individual training, three Navy MOSs, and three Marine Corps MOSs, were 
selected for comparison analysis. The six MOSs represent a range from relatively low 
training cost to high training cost, and were matched with probable outcomes of 
motorcycle accidents.  Table 16 illustrates the comparison analysis for selected MOSs. 
Table 16.   Navy and Marine Corps Individual Accident Cost Comparison 





Cost Accident Cost Total 
Fatality  $       33,803   $      400,000   $       433,803 
Injury & 
Disability  $       33,803  
$         22,032   
+ $       50,000   $       105,835 
Fixed Wing Aircraft 
Power Plants J-52 
Injury   $       33,803   $        22,032   $        55,835 
Fatality  $       74,904   $      400,000   $       474,904 
Injury & 
Disability  $       74,904  
$         22,032   




Injury   $       74,904   $        22,032   $        96,936 
Fatality  $     154,287   $      400,000   $       554,287 
Injury & 
Disability  $     154,287  
$         22,032   
+ $       50,000   $       226,319 Russian Cryptologist 
Injury   $     154,287   $        22,032   $       176,319 





Cost Accident Cost Total 
Fatality  $       25,017  $      400,000   $       425,017 
Injury & 
Disability  $       25,017 
 $        22,032 
+ $      50,000  $        97,049 
Basic Rifleman 
Injury   $       25,017  $        22,032   $        47,049 
Fatality  $     103,799  $      400,000   $       503,799 
Injury & 
Disability  $     103,799 
 $        22,032 
+ $      50,000  $       175,831 
Helicopter Crew 
Chief 
Injury   $     103,799  $        22,032   $       125,831 
Fatality  $     173,505  $      400,000   $       573,505 
Injury & 
Disability  $     173,505 
 $        22,032 
+ $      50,000  $       245,537 Arabic Cryptologist 
Injury   $     173,505  $        22,032   $       195,537 
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G. TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL SAFETY COURSES 
For the purpose of this analysis, the term “traditional course” is used to describe 
the course of instruction provided by the MSF, and takes place on a MSF type riding  
range. The term “non-traditional course” is used to describe a course provided by another 
organization, and takes place at a racetrack.  Most people know this non-traditional 
course as track day. 
1. Traditional Motorcycle Safety Training 
The traditional Motorcycle Safety Foundation (MSF) courses take students 
through a number of riding drills on a range course at speeds usually less than 40 miles 
per hour.  The limited speed at which the MSF course is conducted is good for a rider 
who is learning to ride for the first time.  It allows new riders to focus, and think about 
the actions required to maneuver the motorcycle as desired.  The Military Sport Bike 
Rider Course (MSRC), also provided by the MSF, provides riding drills that are much 
more specific to sport bikes.  The MSRC also is a great tool for building a solid 
foundation for sport bike riders.  However, while all the MSF courses are necessary as 
first-line starter courses, they are somewhat limited when applied to motorcycles and the 
people who ride them.  The first important issue that comes to mind is the lack of other 
traffic when completing an MSF course.  On the riding range, where the students execute 
riding drills, each student performs the drills alone while other students wait their turn.  It 
is extremely rare, however, that a motorcyclist finds himself on the road without having 
to share it with other motorists.  Other motor vehicles can make an inexperienced rider 
both distracted and nervous, especially at highway speeds, which in turn can be a 
negative in terms of learning to ride properly or riding with confidence.  The MSF 
courses do not prepare riders to deal with the different sensory cues that other motor 
vehicles provide on public streets and highways. 
A second issue is the low speeds at which the MSF courses are conducted.  While 
the MSF courses’ relatively low speeds are consistent in helping riders learn the basics of 
controlling a motorcycle, the moment the riders get on public streets and highways, 
where the typical speed limit is between 55 to 65 miles per hour, riders already have to 
 48
ride above their limits.  Basically, not only are inexperienced riders being bombarded 
with sensory and visual cues from other traffic, but are riding faster than they have been 
trained to ride while trying to merge into traffic and maintain highway speeds.  In this 
case, the low speeds at which the riding drills are executed are unrealistic when compared 
to the average speeds on the road, which leads into the next issue. 
The most common single vehicle motorcycle accident is caused by riders’ failure 
to negotiate a curve or losing control in a curve.  Very often, improper initial actions on 
the part of the rider cause a chain reaction that leads to loss of control in a curve.  Based 
on the study completed by TEAM OREGON, some instructors highlighted that students 
who completed the MSF’s BRC lacked head and eye movement which is critical in 
cornering, and were less prepared for cornering (Axman Consulting Incorporated, 2004, 
p. 8).  Inexperienced riders often have difficulty judging closure rate and corner entry 
speed, and looking through a corner as they negotiate it.  The situation is further 
complicated when the rider is dealing with other traffic, and riding above his or her limits 
at speeds faster than those at which they have been trained. 
2. Non-traditional Motorcycle Safety Training 
In comparison to the traditional courses offered by the MSF, a non-traditional 
course, otherwise known as a “track day,” will help riders deal with these issues in a 
controlled environment suited for motorcycles at minimum risk to the riders.  Wikipedia 
describes a motorcycle track day as follows: 
A track day is an organized event in which members of the public are 
allowed to drive or ride around established motor racing circuits, or 
alternatively (though far less common) on closed or disused airfields. 
Most race tracks around the world now provide this facility, whereby any 
road legal or track prepared vehicle, (car or motorcycle) can be used 
without speed restriction (as if racing, though the practice of actual racing 
is almost exclusively forbidden at these events) by members of the public. 
Criteria for being eligible to participate are usually the holding of a driving 
license for the vehicle in question, and the payment of a fee. 
There are varying formats for the proceedings, but they usually consist of 
two or three groups loosely corresponding to an individual’s level of 
experience and/or how quick they are, (e.g., Novice / Intermediate / 
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Advanced or Beginner / Experienced).  One group at a time will then take 
to the track in order that the majority on track at any given time is 
travelling at similar speed, and there is usually time for a varying number 
of these sessions throughout the event. Usually, participants use their own 
vehicles, however a growing number of tracks and organizers can provide 
hire vehicles if required, while quite often, extra facilities such as 
instructor guidance, tire sales and advice and even suspension sales and 
set-up are available. 
Track days are also often held in the guise of racing schools where the 
emphasis is on nurturing the finer skills of machine control and race craft, 
often under the tutelage of experienced former racers. Whatever the 
interpretation, primarily track days are all about having fun, whether 
motorbike or car, the emphasis is on enjoyment in a controlled and 
suitable environment. 
As the performance of vehicles (especially in relation to motorcycles) 
increases, the track day can prove an invaluable means of improving the 
skills necessary to properly control these machines at or nearing their full 
potential in relative safety. It is a common feedback from track day 
enthusiasts that it helps them define the massive distinction between road 
and track riding/driving styles and as a result, through improved skill 
levels and attitudes, can have a positive effect on their road safety. 
As riders and drivers become more secure with their abilities and the track 
environment they can progress to “Open-Pit Lane” events (more common 
with car track days rather than bike days). These events dispense with the 
groups format and participants have unlimited access to the circuit throughout 
the event. This is usually controlled by an organizer by populating the event 
with fewer participants, albeit usually at a higher price, with instructor 
guidance facilities usually available. (Track day, n.d.) 
At an organized track day, riders are broken down into two or three groups, 
depending on their skill level, and each group takes to the track each hour for 20-minute 
sessions.  The grouping is done to encourage riders to ride within their comfort level.  In 
most cases, riders will spend 30 to 35 minutes in classroom sessions discussing various 
riding exercises/drills.  After the classroom sessions, the riders spend their track session 
executing those drills discussed in the classroom under the watchful eyes of “control 
riders” or experienced track day instructors.  Control riders and track day instructors 
usually come with plenty of street riding experience and some racing experience.  After 
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each session, each rider is critiqued and receives feedback from his or her instructor, and 
occasionally instructors will pull riders in from riding sessions to make immediate 
corrections.  Most organizations utilize the lead-follow format of training, where the 
instructor first leads student riders around the track demonstrating the exercises to be 
executed, then follows the student riders as they execute the drills.  When the instructors 
are confident that a student rider can negotiate the track without being a hazard to 
themselves or other riders, the student is released to ride on their own, while still being 
monitored at a distance by on-track instructors.  The purpose for doing this is to build the 
students’ confidence in their own abilities, allow them to execute the drills on their own, 
and to monitor students’ progress and behavior without their knowledge.  This format 
works because, unlike a traditional safety course, the track course teaches to the students’ 
skill levels. 
The track sessions allow inexperienced riders to navigate the racetrack at speeds 
at or above the typical 55 to 65 mph speed limit found on streets and highways.  Learning 
to control motorcycles at realistic speeds help riders judge closure rate, corner entry 
speed, and let them practice how to react quickly and correctly in case of emergencies.   
Track sessions also help riders adjust to riding with other traffic as they pass and 
are passed by other riders, which provides valuable experience in terms of picking up on 
sensory cues without being distracted, and becoming more comfortable with riding in 
traffic. 
Track day organizations place a great amount of emphasis on negotiating curves, 
otherwise known as cornering.  Motorcycles go from point A to B in a straight line with 
very little effort, but where riders usually get into trouble is when cornering.  Track day 
instructions focus on braking for an upcoming corner, corner entry speed, looking 
through the turn, and exiting the corner.  Instructors teach riders to select a riding line, 
ride to the apex of a corner, and find and ride through an exit point.  At the end of a full 
track day, student riders are consistently and simultaneously executing these tasks, and 
successfully negotiating one corner after another. 
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Track days also provide a few additional benefits for riders of all skill levels that 
traditional riding courses do not provide.  First, most track day organizations are now 
utilizing digital video cameras on their instructor bikes that record students’ 
performances throughout the course of the day.  Instructors are able to pick up cues from 
a rider’s body language or riding style that may indicate that he or she needs help or 
requires further instruction.  The video recordings not only allow student riders to hear 
about their performance, but also have the added benefit of letting them see their 
performance as the instructors provide feedback and constructive criticism.  There is 
usually a big difference between what the student thought he or she did versus what he or 
she actually did. 
Second, because the racetrack is a controlled environment, mistakes that lead to 
crashes are much more forgiving than a mistake that leads to a crash on public streets or 
highways.  Most of the riders who crash at a track day event walk away under their own 
power with as little as a bruised ego.  A racetrack is designed to allow riders or drivers 
the leeway of making mistakes and recovering from those mistakes.  Air fences, hay 
bales, run-off areas, and sand traps are just some of the safety features on a racetrack that 
help minimize injury to motorcycle riders attending a track day event.  Additionally, all 
track day organizations are required to have corner workers placed in different areas of 
the track.  The corner workers’ main job is to communicate with the track organizers 
through radios, communicate with riders on the track through colored flags, identify 
unsafe riders or riders who are placed in an incorrect group, and stop the course of riding 
and clear the racetrack in the event of an emergency.  The racetrack is the place to make 
mistakes as the odds of surviving and learning from a crash are extremely high. 
Another benefit for inexperienced riders who attend track day events is that it 
allows the riders to get a better understanding of what can and cannot be done on a 
motorcycle on the street.  It is not uncommon for riders who participate in track day 
events to limit their amount of street riding or stop riding on the street altogether.  Lance 
Keigwin, owner and operator of the Keigwins at the Track organization, has been 
providing track day instructions since 1998, and he believes that participating in track day 
events not only helps riders to improve their street riding skills drastically, but also to 
 52
change riders’ perspective in terms of riding on the street.  In Keigwin’s experience as a 
track day organizer, he has observed that the majority of riders who attend track day 
events either give up riding on the street, or become more conservative when riding on 
the street.  Keigwin believes that “coming to the racetrack does not feed the need to go 
fast on the street, it tames it” (personal communication, September 11, 2009). 
There are several tangible and intangible benefits that come from track day training for 
motorcycle riders.  Track day events are especially beneficial to sport bike riders because it 
allows them to gain a wealth of experience in an extremely small amount of time (normally one 
full day of classroom and track instructions).  Reg Pridmore, a three-time American 
Motorcycle Association (AMA) road racing champion, has been training motorcyclists since 
1974.  In his experience in training motorcyclists, the most common comment heard from 
students at the end of the training day is that they have learned more in one day of track 
instruction than they have in a year—or sometimes 20 years—of riding on the street (R. 
Pridmore, personal communication, March 19, 2009). 
Three-time FIM 500cc Grand Prix World Champion Wayne Rainey believes that 
“Riding a motorcycle should be like putting on your pants.”  He also believes that the 
racetrack is the safest place to learn how to ride a motorcycle properly.  He explains that, 
“Because the conditions on the racetrack never changes…a rider can get to ride safely, 
and be able to get feedback from other riders.  All those things will help a street bike 
rider tremendously” (W. Rainey, personal communication, December 2, 2009).  It is a 
fair assumption that the majority of the professional motorcycle road racing community 
shares the same opinion when it comes to motorcycles and the safest place to operate 
them.  Although Rainey was paralyzed from an accident in a professional motorcycle 
race in 1993, he still believes his injury from that accident is very uncommon.  Rainey 
describes his racetrack experience below.   
I raced motorcycles for 24 years.  I will ride a bike for 15,000 miles each 
year.  That’s practice, that’s testing, that’s qualifying, and that’s racing.  
So that’s 15,000 miles at 95% of what the motorcycle’s capability of 
doing.  I think I fell down three times that year.  Throughout my career, 
I’ve fallen off a bunch.  If you are going to ride a motorcycle at the limit, 
it’s not like a car where you can make a mistake and slide out or spin out, 
and put it back in gear.  On a motorcycle you are going to separate 
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yourself, but 99% of the times I got up and walked away. (W. Rainey, 
personal communication, December 2, 2009) 
Keith Code of the California Superbike School has been training motorcyclist 
since the mid 1970s.  Students who have completed riding courses with Code’s 
organization often leave feedback about how much they have learned, and the level of 
confidence they achieved through the course of instruction.  Code has been working with 
the Marine Corps since 2006 through the Advanced Motorcycle Operator School 
(AMOS), a program specifically designed with reducing service member motorcycle 
accidents in mind.  Since the implementation of Code’s AMOS course, a Second Marine 
Expeditionary Force (2d MEF) motorcycle statistic report for calendar year 2008 
highlighted that with over 330 rider students trained in Code’s AMOS course, there had 
been only three Class C mishaps, compared to the 164 accidents in fiscal year 2008 for 
non-AMOS riders (2d Marine Expeditionary Force, 2009).  This may indicate that non-
traditional training may be the most effective way of reducing motorcycle accidents in 
the Navy and Marine Corps 
3. Cost Comparison:  Traditional and Non-traditional Safety Training 
Traditional and non-traditional motorcycle training costs vary depending on the 
location of the training.  On average, the Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s (MSF) Basic 
Rider Course (BRC) costs the military approximately $250 per rider for riders 21 years 
and older, and $150 for riders younger than 21 years of age.  The Military Sport Bike 
Rider Course (MSRC) costs are similar to the BRC, while the Experienced Rider Course 
(ERC) costs approximately $150 per rider (J. Rice, personal communication, January 10, 
2010).  The BRC is mandatory for all Navy and Marine motorcycle riders regardless of 
the type of motorcycle each service member rides.  The MSRC is mandatory for all Navy 
and Marine Corps personnel who ride sport bikes, while the ERC is not mandatory, but 
highly recommended for those service members who do not ride sport bikes. 
On average, non-traditional motorcycle courses are priced from $150 to $350 
depending on the location of the training.  Traditionally, the most expensive courses are 
associated with the name of the track where the event is being held.  For example, most riders 
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can complete a motorcycle course at Buttonwillow Raceway in Buttonwillow, California, or 
Willow Springs Raceway in Rosamond, California, for approximately $150 per rider, while 
completing a course at Laguna Seca in Monterey, California, or Infineon Raceway in Sonoma, 
California, may cost as much as $280 per rider.  Most organizations that conduct non-
traditional motorcycle training have schedules that take them to several different locations, over 
several months.  The organizations’ flexible schedules offer riders plenty of opportunities to 
choose a date and location that best fits the riders’ schedules and budgets.  Table 17 shows a 
partial schedule for the North Eastern Sport Bike Association (NESBA), which illustrates a 
typical track day organization’s schedule and costs. 
Table 17.   Typical Track Day Schedule and Costs (From North Eastern Sport 
Bike Association, 2010) 
February 
Date Track Location Price 
2/27/2010 Barber Birmingham, AL $205  
2/28/2010 Barber Birmingham, AL $205  
April 
Date Track Location Price 
4/2/2010 Road Atlanta Braselton, GA $195  
4/3/2010 Road Atlanta Braselton, GA $205  
4/4/2010 Road Atlanta Braselton, GA $195  
4/24/2010 Barber Birmingham, AL $205  
4/25/2010 Barber Birmingham, AL $205  
May 
Date Track Location Price 
5/14/2010 VIR - North Alton, VA $185  
5/15/2010 VIR - South Alton, VA $185  
5/28/2010 Road Atlanta Braselton, GA $195  
5/29/2010 Road Atlanta Braselton, GA $205  
5/30/2010 Road Atlanta Braselton, GA $195  
June 
Date Track Location Price 
6/12/2010 CMP Kershaw, SC $155  
6/13/2010 CMP Kershaw, SC $155  
July 
Date Track Location Price 
7/3/2010 VIR - South Alton, VA $165  
7/4/2010 VIR - South Alton, VA $165  
7/16/2010 VIR - Full Course Alton, VA $195  
7/17/2010 VIR - Patriot Alton, VA $125  
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In order to compare the costs of a traditional MSF course to a non-traditional 
course, the following table is created with estimates for each type of course.  A 2007 
demographics report conducted by the Personnel and Family Readiness Division, 
Headquarters, Marine Corps, reported that 24 percent of all Marines were younger than 
age 21 (Marine Corps Community Services, 2007, p. 2).  This demographic was applied 
to those who rode motorcycles in the Navy and Marine Corps in order to complete the 
estimate.  An estimate for the Experienced Rider Course (ERC) was not included since 
the course is not mandatory.  However, if all non-sport bike riders decide to complete the 
ERC at its current $150 cost, the overall estimate would come to approximately $4 
million.  Table 18 illustrates those cost estimates. 
Table 18.   Traditional and Non-traditional Motorcycle Course Cost Estimates 
BRC Cost 
  All Riders Cost Total 
Younger than 21 11558 $150  $   1,733,688.00  
Older than 21 36600 $250  $   9,150,020.00  
Total Cost      $ 10,883,708.00  
MSRC Cost 
  Sport Bike Riders Cost Total 
Younger than 21 5190 $150  $      778,428.00  
Older than 21 16433 $250  $   4,108,370.00  
Total Cost      $   4,886,798.00  
Non-traditional Course 
  All Riders Cost Total 
Younger than 21 11558 $200  $   2,311,584.00  
Older than 21 36600 $200  $   7,320,016.00  
Total Cost      $   9,631,600.00  
 
Realistically, motorcycle safety training could not accommodate all motorcycle 
riders in the Navy and Marine Corps in a single year.  Therefore, it is relatively fair to 
assume that the training could be spread over a period of 3 years to minimize the overall 
annual cost to the military.  Essentially, it would cost a total of $9.6 million to provide 
non-traditional training to all motorcycle riders in the Department of the Navy.  This 
would amount to approximately $3.2 million annually, with this amount divided between 
the Navy and Marine Corps based on the number of riders from each service.  The costs 
of the traditional and non-traditional motorcycle courses are relatively equal.  The 
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difference is in the value of the training that the riders receive.  The MSF motorcycle 
safety courses may just be touching the surface when it comes to what it really takes to 
fully control a motorcycle on public streets or highways.  A non-traditional motorcycle 
course builds on the skills that a rider has learned from a traditional motorcycle course.  
Typical non-traditional or track day riding courses serve several purposes.  Track day 
riding courses: 
 Provide realistic training at realistic speeds. 
 Help riders understand their own capabilities and the capabilities of their 
motorcycles, and are tailored to fit various riding levels. 
 Help riders understand how the components on their motorcycles work 
together when operating in the street environment. 
 Reinforce a great amount of training and practice in a very short period of 
time. 
 Provide continuous on-track practice sessions to maximize actual riding 
time. 
 Quench riders’ need for speed on the street by providing a legal outlet. 
 Help riders understand the danger of riding fast on the street. 
 Deter aggressive riding behavior on the street that may be hazardous to the 
riders and the general public. 
Motorcycle riding is inherently risky.  Riders who are unprepared to handle their 
motorcycles are at a much higher risk of being involved in an accident that may result in 
death or serious injury to themselves or others.  Realistic training and practice 
significantly reduces that risk.  Most track day organizers and track day school instructors 
agree that track day riders become much safer, more-experienced street riders who 
understand their limits when riding on public streets and highways.  Non-traditional track 
courses provide a safe, fun environment where riders can learn to find their personal 
limits. 
4. Cost Benefit Analysis:  Making the Training Worthwhile  
The two most important assets in a military organization are people and capital.  Both 
the Navy and Marine Corps seek to utilize their manpower and capital effectively.  In terms 
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of motorcycle training, the Navy and the Marine Corps aspire to gain effective training for 
motorcycle riders through efficient spending (best bang for the buck).  The best indicator of 
effective motorcycle training is a decrease in the number of motorcycle accidents and 
fatalities.  The increase in motorcycle incidents over the past nine years indicates that the 
current approved motorcycle safety training may not be as effective as the services had 
intended.  Therefore, it may be worth it to consider an alternative type of training in the form 
of non-traditional track courses.  While there are no official studies indicating how effective 
non-traditional track courses are in reducing the number of accidents and fatalities, track 
instructors, and riders who have completed these courses, are convinced that the track 
courses better prepare riders for riding on the street.  From a military standpoint, the non-
traditional track courses should be effective enough to show a distinct decrease in the number 
of motorcycle accidents and fatalities in any given period.  Based on the cost estimate for 
non-traditional track courses discussed in the previous section, the annual cost is assumed to 
be $3.2 million for the entire Department of the Navy.  The reduction in the number of 
annual accidents and fatalities must be enough to offset the cost of the non-traditional track 
courses.  The following formula illustrates how to determine an effective decrease in the 





In 2008, there were 58 fatalities and 423 accidents throughout the Department of 
the Navy.  The monetized cost for Department of the Navy motorcycle fatalities was 
$23.2 million, while all accidents cost the Department of the Navy $30.4 million.  Using 
these figures, the necessary reduction in the number of accidents and fatalities was 




ΔF * Fatality Cost =  Training Cost, where ΔF  is the decrease in the number of  fatalities. 
  
ΔA* Accident Cost = Training Cost, where ΔA is the decrease in the number of accidents.  
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Table 19.   Cost Benefit Analysis for Non-traditional Motorcycle Training 
Non-traditional Training Cost Benefit Analysis 
  Dept. of the Navy Monetized Cost Training Cost Delta Effect 
Fatality 
Cost 58 fatalities  $       23,200,000   $      3,200,000 13.79% 8 lives 
Accident 




For the non-traditional track courses to be considered effective and worth 
pursuing, the Department of the Navy would be looking for at least a 13.79 percent 
decrease in the number of motorcycle fatalities, or a 10.52 percent decrease in the number 
of motorcycle accidents in a 1-year period.  These two percentages indicate that the 
Department of the Navy should consider non-traditional track courses to be a worthwhile 
investment if the training effect decreases the number of motorcycle fatalities by eight or 
more, or decreases the number of accidents by 45 or more.  
H. SELECTING SERVICE MEMBERS FOR TRAINING 
Since the military does not have unlimited time or funds to dedicate to motorcycle 
training, a systematic approach to selecting the Sailors and Marines who will be offered  
non-traditional motorcycle training must be used.  The motorcycle accident data provided 
by the Naval Safety Center indicate that the Sailors and Marines ranging in the 17- to 29-
year age group are the service members who will most likely be involved in motorcycle 
accidents. Service members who fall in this age group category should be given the 
highest priority as far as training is concerned in order to minimize the risk of death or 
serious injury.  Sailors and Marines who have already been involved in motorcycle 
accidents should be given the next highest priority.  Traditionally, those service members 
who have had an accident are more inclined to be involved in more motorcycle accidents.  
Multiple accidents may indicate more risky behavior on the part of the service member, 
which is precisely the type of behavior that track day training is used to curtail.  Service 
members who ride motorcycles, and who are returning from deployment should be next 
on the priority list to receive the non-traditional motorcycle training.  These returning 
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riders who have spent the last several months unable to ride a motorcycle, in most cases, 
may have significantly diminished riding skills.  The non-traditional motorcycle courses 
may help to bring Sailors and Marines up to speed quickly in terms of skill in one full 
training day.  The track day training provides an environment that promotes realistic 
training at minimum risk to the rider, and serves as the fun way to acquire the skills to 
become a better street rider. 
As military organizations, the Navy and the Marine Corps desire to provide the 
most effective motorcycle safety training for Sailors and Marines.  In most cases, the 
services mandate that Sailors and Marines must complete the approved motorcycle safety 
training within a specific time period.  The Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s (MSF) Basic 
Rider Course (BRC) and the Military Sport Bike Rider Course (MSRC) are both 
mandatory courses, while the Experienced Rider Course (ERC) is not mandatory, but 
highly recommended.  All three courses are provided by the same organization, 
essentially creating a monopoly on motorcycle training in the military.  This point raises 
one very important issue:  What motivates the MSF course organizers to provide Sailors 
and Marines with the best possible training considering that (1) the organization has a 
monopoly on motorcycle safety training not only in the military, but nationwide as well, 
and (2) the Department of the Navy has made the course mandatory for riders?  The short 
answer:  Nothing.  By making the motorcycle safety courses mandatory through a single 
provider, the Department of the Navy has become a captured audience to the MSF.  One 
way to deal with this issue is to allow the rider to select the type of training he or she 
believes is best suited to his or her motorcycle type and riding style. 
The MSF’s BRC is recognized nationwide as the main provider of motorcycle 
safety training for the novice rider.  While arguably not the best training available, the 
MSF’s BRC is recognized by most state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMV) as 
sufficient training in earning a motorcycle license.  Understandably, the military is in a 
position where they will have to continue using the MSF’s BRC to train novice riders.  
However, since there are multiple avenues available for providing follow-on motorcycle 
safety training for Sailors and Marines, the Navy and Marine Corps could exercise the 
option of allowing the individual Sailor or Marine to choose among the ERC, the MSRC, 
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and non-traditional track courses.  This option allows the Navy and Marine Corps to 
address several issues.  By giving the individual Sailor or Marine the choice of follow-on 
motorcycle safety training: 
 Sailors and Marines will opt for the type of motorcycle safety training that 
they believe is worth their time. 
 Sailors and Marines will opt for the training that best suits their 
motorcycle type, and the riders’ riding style. 
 Sailors and Marines will form their own opinion on whether or not a 
particular type of training was helpful in providing them with better riding 
skills. 
 Risk takers may naturally gravitate to the non-traditional track courses.  
This is one of the target groups that may need help in improving skill and 
overall rider attitude. 
 Motorcycle training organizations would ensure they provide the riders 
with the best possible training in order to remain competitive among 
similar organizations, and attract more customers. 
Giving the Sailor or Marine the opportunity to choose a preferred type of follow-
on motorcycle safety training comes at no extra cost to the Navy or Marine Corps.  
Essentially, the services would spend the same annual amount on motorcycle safety 
training with the same number of Sailors and Marines completing their choice of 
motorcycle safety course.  In fact, the Navy and Marine Corps could possibly spend less 
if more riders opt for the non-traditional track courses, since a majority of the track 





V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The Navy and Marine Corps lose thousands of hours of manpower due to 
motorcycle related injuries and fatalities on an annual basis.  Along with the loss of 
manpower, the secondary effect of motorcycle related injuries and fatalities, is the 
millions of dollars spent on hospitalization costs and life insurance.  Both Navy and 
Marine Corps leadership have recognized that motorcycles pose a serious threat to 
operational readiness and manpower in terms of people and money, the services’ most 
precious assets.  This research analyzed how motorcycle accidents affect manpower and 
mission readiness in the Navy and Marine Corps.  One of the objectives of this study was 
to examine whether the current approved motorcycle safety training used by the Navy 
and Marine Corps is best suited to reduce motorcycle accidents, injuries, and fatalities.  
Another objective of this study is to help Navy and Marine Corps decision makers select 
motorcycle training that is more effective in reducing motorcycle related manpower 
losses.  The research was intended to answer the following questions: 
 How do motorcycle accidents affect mission readiness in the Navy and 
Marine Corps? 
 What are the primary causes of accidents in the Navy and Marine Corps? 
 How are Sailors and Marines selected for training for motorcycle training 
courses? 
The literature review highlighted several studies that sought to determine the main 
causes of motorcycle accidents, and whether or not the current traditional courses being 
offered were serving the intended purpose of reducing motorcycle accident and fatalities. 
Professor Hugh Hurt’s 1981 study highlighted the need for a motorcycle safety 
course, and named the Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s Motorcycle Rider Course as the 
most effective way to reduce motorcycle accidents and fatalities. 
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A later study, conducted by Team Oregon, determined that the Motorcycle Safety 
Foundation’s Basic Rider Course, a later version of the Motorcycle Rider Course, did not 
satisfy the needs of the novice motorcycle rider. 
Other studies highlight the fact that hospitalization costs associated with 
motorcycle related injuries would be substantial when considering the average 10-day 
length of stay for motorcyclist requiring hospitalization. 
This thesis used several analysis tools to determine the probability of accidents 
resulting in injuries or fatalities.  The thesis also analyzed the cost of recruiting and 
training individuals for military service, and the cost of life insurance and hospitalization 
as a result of motorcycle accidents. 
Probit regression models were used to estimate the probabilities of a Sailor or 
Marine being involved in a motorcycle accident that resulted in death or injury causing 
the individual to miss work.  The regression results highlighted that there were 
consistencies among the models used to estimate those probabilities.  The estimated 
probabilities of fatality or injury, and the significant variables are presented below. 
 Operating a sport bike increases an individual’s probability of being 
killed, if in an accident, by approximately 6 percentage points. 
 For a rider who is in an accident, approved motorcycle safety training 
initially reduces that rider’s probability of having an injury that requires 
time from work by approximately 10 percentage points. 
 For a rider who is in an accident, approved motorcycle safety training 
increases the rider’s probability of being killed by approximately 3 
percentage points. 
 If a rider is involved in a motorcycle accident, there is a 10 percent 
probability of the rider being killed even if the rider has completed 
approved motorcycle safety training. 
 If a rider is involved in a motorcycle accident, there is an 87 percent 
probability of the rider sustaining injuries that require time from work 
even if the rider has completed approved motorcycle safety training. 
The motorcycle accident data and the results of the probit regressions are inconclusive in 
determining the effects motorcycle safety training has on reducing the probability of 
accidents and fatalities in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
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The Navy and Marine Corps spend millions of dollars to recruit and train service 
members for various military occupational specialties (MOSs).  Recruiting costs can 
range from $10,000 to $13,000 per individual.  In training service members, some 
occupational specialties can cost the military up to $163,000 per individual.  When a 
Sailor or Marine is killed or injured in a motorcycle accident, the services suffer 
manpower and training investment losses.  The individual Sailor or Marine will be unable 
to fulfill his or her military contract due to loss of life, or extended period of absence 
from work.  The cost situation is exacerbated because of additional costs to recruit and 
train individuals to replace those killed or permanently injured in motorcycle accidents. 
Life insurance covers a large proportion of the monetized costs associated with 
fatal motorcycle accidents.  Service Member Group Life Insurance (SGLI) is likely to 
pay up to $400,000 per member, to the families of those killed in a motorcycle accident 
while on active duty.  The data from the Naval Safety Center indicate that less than 20 
percent of the motorcycle accidents result in rider fatality, while greater than 50 percent 
result in injury requiring time from work.  The average hospitalization period for injuries 
due to a motorcycle accident is estimated at 10 days, accruing a cost of approximately 
$22,000 per person.  The monetized cost associated with motorcycle accidents in the 
Navy and Marine Corps for 2008 alone was $18.2 million and $12.2 million, 
respectively.  Analysis also indicates that individual Sailors and Marines who are 
involved in motorcycle accidents, could accrue an investment ranging from 
approximately $50,000 to $570,000 depending on their occupational specialty and 
severity of injuries.  These figures do not account for the cost of lost man-hours or the 
cost of rehabilitation, which would depend on the exact period each service member is 
absent from work, the service member’s pay grade, work lost during rehabilitation, and 
the cost per hour of rehabilitation. 
This thesis highlights that the traditional MSF courses and the non-traditional 
track courses have relatively the same costs.  The difference is reflected in the value of 
realistic training and practice provided by a non-traditional track course.  Historically, 
track day riders are better street riders because of the experience learned from a full day  
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of instruction and riding on the track.  Track day organizations provide fairly flexible 
event schedules that will normally fit various personal schedules and budgets.  Track day 
training is not limited to sport bikes only. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Over 48,000 Sailors and Marines ride motorcycles, and about 45 percent of them 
ride sport bikes.  Though only a small proportion of riders are involved in motorcycle 
accidents annually, that small percentage has gained a great amount of attention and 
accrued a fairly large bill in the process.  In 2008, the equivalent combined monetized 
cost for motorcycle related injuries and fatalities in the Navy and Marine Corps totaled 
just over $30 million.  More than 70 percent of all Sailors and Marines involved in 
motorcycle accidents were operating sport bikes. About 12 percent of those accident 
victims died, and more than half of the accident victims had accident-related injuries that 
prevented them from performing their jobs. 
The Navy and Marine Corps have mandated that all motorcycle riders complete 
an approved motorcycle safety course.  Each service ensures that Sailors and Marines are 
afforded the opportunity to complete approved motorcycle safety training at no cost to 
the individual.  This study indicates that the current approved motorcycle safety courses 
may not be the right courses for Sailors and Marines, and may not be enough to effect a 
reduction in the number of annual motorcycle accidents, injuries, and fatalities.  Sailors 
and Marines are attempting to merge into traffic and ride at designated speed limits when 
they have not been taught to merge or ride at traffic speeds.  The number of reported 
motorcycle accidents reached 259 in the Navy and 164 in the Marine Corps in fiscal year 
2008.  Based on these figures, it is fair to assume that if the type of training offered is not 
overhauled in the right way, more Sailors and Marines will be injured or will die as a 
result of motorcycle accidents on public roads and highways.   
When a Sailor or Marine is injured or killed in a motorcycle accident, each 
service experiences a loss of manpower, negative return on individual investment, and 
potentially a substantial loss in readiness.  In order to make a difference in reducing the 
number of accidents and fatalities the Navy and Marine Corps need to explore other 
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training alternatives such as track day events.  Motorcycle experts believe that riders can 
learn and experience more from one track day training event than from years of riding on 
the street.  The intent of the training is to reduce motorcycle accidents and fatalities in the 
Navy and Marine Corps and in doing so reduce losses in manpower, reduce financial 
costs for each service, and improve readiness. 
The thesis research conclusions are limited by factors associated with the data 
used in the separate analyses.  First, we have no data on the effect of motorcycle training 
on the probability of having a motorcycle accident.  Second, both the Navy and Marine 
Corps motorcycle accident data contained missing observations for several regression 
variables.  The Navy motorcycle accident data was more complete than Marine Corps 
motorcycle accident data, and highlighted some inconsistencies in the method of data 
collection.  Had this missing data been available, more precise probability estimates may 
have been determined.  Missing data may limit the full effect of the regression results.  
Third, the use of average hospitalization cost, and average length of hospital stay may 
bias the cost estimates.  Actual hospitalization costs depend not only on the number of 
days spent in a hospital facility, but also on the type of injuries the riders sustain, and 
whether there were surgeries involved as a result of the injuries.  Rehabilitation costs 
were also omitted.  The motorcycle accident data did not provide information on 
individual injury type or hours of rehabilitation for the purpose of calculating actual cost.  
One conclusion that can be drawn, based solely on the motorcycle accident data, is that 
sport bikes pose a greater threat to service members than any other motorcycle type, 
regardless of pay grade or occupational specialty. 
Motorcycles can be extremely dangerous in the hands of a Sailor or Marine who 
does not understand his or her own capabilities on a motorcycle, or the capabilities of the 
motorcycle.  Some Sailors and Marines may not have grasped the reality that riding a 
motorcycle is a daily commitment to learning something new.  Effective, realistic training 
makes owning and riding a motorcycle much safer and much more fun.  Motorcycle 
training that is not on par with the motorcycles being purchased and ridden is less than 
effective.  The phrase “we train the way we fight” is often used in the Navy and Marine 
Corps in reference to training for military operations.  This phrase should apply to any 
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form of training that involves Sailors and Marines, including motorcycle training.  Ill-
prepared motorcycle riders on the street are the same as ill-prepared service members in 
combat.  Their chances of survival are significantly reduced.  Mandating the right 
training for the right rider ensure Sailors and Marines get the opportunity to make it to the 
fight. 
The data and the corresponding analyses highlight that motorcycles accidents 
have been a serious issue in the Navy and Marine Corps over the past decade.  The 
current approved motorcycle safety training offered to Sailors and Marines provides the 
basics of riding a motorcycle.  Unfortunately, in the age of the technologically enhanced 
street bike, the basics alone may not be enough to prevent valuable loss of our talented 
service members to unnecessary motorcycle accidents.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The capabilities of the latest motorcycles have far surpassed the level of skill 
being taught by the safety courses the military require today.  Sailors and Marines are in 
need of a better motorcycle safety course that will provide them with better rider training, 
and ultimately better riding skills.  Furthermore, the constant fluctuation in gas prices 
over the last few years, and the possibility of increased gas prices, may result in an influx 
of Sailors and Marines trading in four-wheeled vehicles for motorcycles.  In order to 
make an impact in reducing motorcycle injuries and fatalities in the Navy and Marine 
Corps, the following actions are recommended: 
 Incorporate a lead/follow street ride portion within the allotted curriculum 
hours of the current approved motorcycle safety courses.  This gives 
motorcycle safety instructors the opportunity to demonstrate riding on the 
street and evaluate students’ ability to handle the street environment.  The 
instructor may then make a determination as to whether or not the student 
is ready for the street environment or need further instructions in order to 
safely operate on public roads. 
 Establish data collection repositories in order to conduct further studies 
that capture and compare the differences in behavior, skill, and accident 
trends in Sailors and Marines who have track day experience versus those 
who do not. 
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 Track the costs of life insurance, hospitalization, and rehabilitation due to 
fatalities and injuries caused by motorcycle accidents to get a better sense 
of how important the correct training is to reducing cost. 
 Provide Sailors and Marines the option to choose among the ERC, MSRC, 
or a non-traditional track course.  Allowing Sailors and Marines to select 
the training that best suits their motorcycle type or riding style helps 
student riders to become more involved in the type of training they 
receive.  Sailors and Marines will opt for training that they determine is 
worthwhile, and hence be more attentive.  Additionally, allowing Sailors 
and Marines to choose their preferred motorcycle safety courses enables 
the Navy and Marine Corps to add another training option at no extra cost. 
Based on the verbal discussion of non-traditional motorcycle safety courses the following 
additional actions are recommended: 
 Consider signing contracts with reputable non-traditional motorcycle 
training organizations to provide Sailors and Marines with follow-on 
training at no cost to the service members.  This will minimize the number 
of Sailors and Marines awaiting training, as well as reduce the number of 
days Sailors and Marines are delayed before attending training.  
Additionally, competition among different motorcycle training 
organizations motives them to provide the best training for Sailors and 
Marines.  Most of these organizations already incorporate lead/follow 
techniques, and video footage feedback within their curriculum. 
One important issue that warrants discussion is whether providing mandatory 
motorcycle safety courses funded by the military motivates riders to participate with the 
true intention of learning.  A motorcycle safety course that keeps riders fully engaged in 
the curriculum is capable of providing those riders with the knowledge and skill needed 
to operate a motorcycle.  The problem lies in the individual Sailor or Marine whose 
passion for riding and learning to ride differs greatly from person to person.  Each 
person’s attitude toward the safety course determines the value that person generates 
from the course.  Taking into account that Navy regulations mandate that a course is 
taken, and that the individual rider does not pay for the course, further complicates 
determining whether riders value the training they receive.  Some riders may find a 
wealth of value in one course, while others merely tolerate the same course for the 
purpose of fulfilling a requirement.  Giving the riders the option to choose the course that 
is most compatible with their riding style may only slightly alleviate this problem.  Only 
the riders who are truly motivated to learn new skills would find value in any of the 
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courses.  There is no definite answer associated with the question of rider motivation 
towards a mandatory course funded by the military.  The lack of a definite answer 
undermines the previous recommendations.  These recommendations are highly 
dependent on rider motivation towards learning. 
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